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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses the impact of boiler room operations on both
the public and law enforcement agencies and discusses a coordinated
criminal and civil approach to the problem. Boiler rooms involve
both regulated and unregulated investments. The products which
may be promoted via boiler rooms are limited only by the imagina-
tion of the boiler room operator. Federal, state and local agencies at
both the criminal and regulatory administrative level are involved in
the investigation and prosecution of boiler room fraud.
II. SCOPE OF THE BOILER ROOM PROBLEM
In early 1982, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of
the United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs (the
Subcommittee) held hearings during which it was disclosed that
thousands of Americans are victimized each year by operators of
boiler rooms engaged in commodity fraud.' Witnesses before the
Subcommittee estimated the annual consumer loss from such opera-
tions at approximately $200 million. The scope of the Subcommit-
tee's investigation extended beyond the narrow area of commodities
as defined in the Commodity Exchange Act2 into the areas of securi-
ties and business practices regulated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), as
well as the unregulated investment market.
Following the enactment of the Futures Trading Act of 1982,3 the
Subcommittee held a second round of hearings on commodity invest-
ment fraud.4 At that time, the staff of the Subcommittee reaffirmed
1. S. REP. No. 495, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 5, at 49 (1982).
2. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
3. Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (1983) (codified in scattered sections of 7
U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.). The legislative history of the Futures Trading Act of 1982 is set
out in H.R. REP. NO. 595, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 3871-4077.
4. See Commodity Investment Fraud II. Hearings Before the Permanent Sub-
comm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1984) [hereinafter Commodity Investment Fraud II]; see also Investment Fraud
Schemes: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984).
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its 1982 finding that the public was losing more than $200 million per
year in commodity investment fraud schemes, accounting for losses
of over $1 billion between 1975 and 1982.5 Senator Warren Rudman
stated that: "[A]fter chairing these hearings for a couple of days and
last year .... my own estimate at this point is that people of this
country are being cheated out of a sum of money somewhere in ex-
cess of a half billion dollars annually."6 Witnesses estimated that as
of 1984, there were some 8,000 boiler rooms in active operation na-
tionwide, 200 of which are located in Dade and Broward Counties,
Florida.7
Witnesses also uniformly concluded that civil and administrative
remedies were ineffective to curtail boiler room operators and that
criminal prosecution was the only effective tool in this area.8 Wit-
nesses also documented cases in which the cash hoards collected by
boiler room promoters were moved into offshore bank accounts and
real estate holdings in the Cayman Islands and in the Turks and Cai-
cos Islands.9
The Subcommittee further discovered that the majority of com-
modity fraud schemes are contrived by an identifiable cadre of recidi-
vists who systematically generate fraudulent operations throughout
the country. Principals and salesmen move freely from one opera-
tion to the next while avoiding prosecution and earning huge in-
comes. More stationary firms operating for only a short period of
time may still succeed in bilking investors out of hundreds of
thousands of dollars.0
III. NATURE OF BOILER ROOM SCHEMES
Boiler room salesmen pitch (sell) anything and everything, from
oil and gas leases to parcels of land, from tax shelters to industrial
chemicals and specialty items."1 Since 1978 their most popular prod-
ucts have been gold, silver, platinum and copper.1 2 Precious metals
promotions have developed as one significant area of fraud costing
the public millions of dollars. The perpetrators of precious metals
5. Commodity Investment Fraud II, supra note 4, at 145.
6. Id. at 88.
7. Id. at 22.
8. Id at 17, 80, 83, 84, 87, 177.
9. Id. at 17, 44.
10. Id. at 145 (Staff Statement of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs).
11. Id. at 177.
12. Id. at 173.
scams profess to offer valuable investments in gold, silver, or other
metals in the form of bullion or coins, but typically such individuals
are "precious metal dealers" in name only. Unlike reputable bullion
dealers, these dealers do not possess the precious metals which they
purport to sell nor do they have the ability or intention to obtain
such metals to fulfill their obligations.
While programs utilized by different precious metals swindlers
vary, the most common types of promotions involve either delayed
delivery contracts or leverage-type contracts. In the former, custom-
ers pay for their order in full via credit card, wire transfer, or by
mailing cash, checks, or money orders. More often, however, custom-
ers buy metals on leverage or installment contracts for future deliv-
ery. In the most legitimate of these fraudulent schemes, the dealer
sells the gold at a set price per ounce with delivery set at some date
in the future. The buyer is led to believe that the dealer completed
the purchase on that day and is holding the buyer's gold. The dealer
will hope for a falling market in gold so he can cover the purchase at
a lower price in the spot market at the time of delivery. The dealer
would then pocket the difference between the sales price and the
cover price. If the price of the gold increases between the day of
purchase and the day of delivery, the dealer goes bankrupt. In the
more typical case, however, the dealer sells gold for future delivery
and simply steals 100% of the purchase price. Because of the time de-
lay between the purchase date and scheduled delivery date, the
dealer can make his money and be long gone before victims become
aware that they have been defrauded.
A second area of fraud very popular with boiler room swindlers in-
volves oil and gas leases. The Bureau of Land Management of the
United States Department of the Interior administers public auctions
at which it sells drilling and mineral rights to certain parcels of pub-
lic land. These sales involve land which the government has deter-
mined to be either unlikely to contain valuable minerals or to contain
minerals which cannot feasibly be captured. The statistical likeli-
hood of any individual investor winning the lease rights to a valuable
parcel is extremely small. A number of promoters represent to in-
vestors that for a fee the promoter can substantially increase, or even
guarantee the chances of winning such a worthwhile lease. Promot-
ers often represent that the parcel is immediately adjacent to a
proven reserve, when in fact, it is miles from any established reserve.
The promoters frequently represent that major oil companies will be
climbing over each other competing to buy the parcels from the in-
vestors, when they know that the major oil companies have no inter-
est whatsoever in the affected parcels. Such promoters will also sell
interests in land which they do not own, or sell the same parcel many
times over. In one particular case, a promoter formed a limited part-
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nership among investors to drill for coal and other minerals on a par-
cel of land which he had leased from the government. Unfor-
tunately, in his lease with the government, all rights to coal and
other minerals were retained by the United States.1 3
A third area of fraud conducted by boiler rooms is the sale of inex-
pensive and defective goods not conforming to the seller's description
which induced the buyer to make the purchase. A typical example
involves boiler room salespeople contacting business people and ad-
vising them that they have been selected to win a valuable prize for
which only business people are eligible. In order to establish that the
winner really was a business person, one would only need to buy a
quantity of ball point pens with the business name and telephone
number printed thereon. After receipt of the victim's payment, the
promoter might send nothing, or send a prior victim's pens, or even
send cheap pens with the victim's name and telephone number. Usu-
ally, the victims will not receive the prize which induced them to buy
the pens in the first place. If a victim does receive a prize, the value
of the prize and the pens together will not equal the amount which
the victim paid.
The prior discussion describes only three contemporary examples
of popular fraudulent schemes. They only serve to illustrate the type
of activity conducted by boiler room operators. There is no limit to
the products which might form the basis for the operator's promo-
tions. Usually, promoters will target any product which the media
has recently discussed as a good investment. The only limit upon the
products which serve as the basis for boiler room operations is the
imagination of the con artist running the boiler room.
IV. OPERATION OF THE BOILER ROOM
A boiler room transaction is nothing more than a fraudulent sale of
an investment to the public by high pressure telephone sales tech-
niques. Boiler rooms are typically operations which are created and
managed by career con artists and designed to prey upon the invest-
ing public. The modi operandi of a boiler room operation are: 1) the
communication of false and fraudulent representations concerning
the value or existence of the investment, product and/or service sold
13. United States v. Osserman, No. CR-80-371-T, slip. op. (D. Mass. Feb. 5, 1982).
The principals involved in the limited partnership were convicted of one count each of
conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341,
and fraudulent tax return preparation in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2).
to the public; 2) the use of high-pressure sales techniques over the
telephone; 3) the solicitation of victims outside the jurisdiction of the
operation's situs; and 4) the ability to relocate quickly to avoid
prosecution.
Setting ... up [a boiler room] is cheap and it is simple. All it takes are desks,
file cabinets, and a bank of telephones. Sales personnel work hours on the
phones and they make huge sums of money.
The methodology is simple: Fast talk and extremely high sales pressure tac-
tics. Inside the boiler room the din is numbing. Sales people are crammed
into close quarters. The music is often blaring. And most of these operations,
these fraudulent boiler room operations, are operated on the basis of what is
known again in the vernacular in law enforcement as a Ponzi scheme.
It is very simple. Victims are talked into investing through promises of high
profits and then they are strung along through delaying tactics, such as the
issuance of small dividends or rebates. Only the most vocal complainants re-
ceive any money or metals.
The companies begin with prospect lists that they buy or that they may ad-
vertise. And the salesmen start with what is called the front speech. It is
designed, simply put, to fan curiosity, interest, perhaps greed. The prospects
that seem hot are then papered. That is to say they are sent a sales brochure
with exaggerations frequently and misrepresentations. Next comes the fol-
low-up call, usually a week or so later, then the drive call, then the takeover
call, and finally the close, which is designed to get the check in the mail
quickly.
The customers that they seek are customers whom they can derive repeat
sales from. When the boiler room nears its breaking point, the salespeople
make what are referred to as drop calls. That is to say they offer discounts
and premiums such as free trips. And then comes the common scenario, what
we again call in the vernacular the bust-out. The owner leaves town or per-
haps he just moves down the block and opens up under a new name and starts
up a scam all over again.
1 4
Typically, the boiler room is a highly organized operation with
management level personnel and a sales force which receives incen-
tives such as money and/or drugs based upon the volume of sales.
The salesmen are generally provided with written scripts, or "pitch-
sheets" which are designed to entice the investor and provide persua-
sive answers to any questions the potential customer might have.
These oral representations may be supplemented with professionally
made written materials and glossy brochures which lend the opera-
tion an added appearance of respectability. Some boiler room opera-
tions are so large and profitable that they operate branch offices and
others have become so sophisticated that they have turned to com-
puterization of their financial records and customer lists.
A. Locations of Boiler Rooms
While no place is immune from boiler room operations, South Flor-
14. Commodity Investment Fraud II, supra note 4, at 73 (testimony of Stanley
Marcus, former United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, before the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Governmen-
tal Affairs, Mar. 21, 1984).
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ida and Southern California are the capitals for such fraud for rea-
sons including an abundance of willing and experienced "boiler
room" salesmen, fair weather, low rents, wealthy investors and a fast
lifestyle. Easy access to offshore banking and drugs coupled with
competing claims to law enforcement resources due to high levels of
violent crime and drug trafficking make South Florida an especially
attractive haven for precious metals schemes.15
Boiler room operators tend to solicit out-of-state customers so that
there are no local complainants. When customers realize that they
have been victimized, the agencies to which they complain generally
find that the con artist is not present within the agency's jurisdiction.
The boiler room operator counts upon the local law enforcement
agency's natural hesitancy to pursue criminal activity in another
state as well as the inability of the victim to locate the correct law
enforcement agency within the operator's state in order to file a com-
plaint. Thus, by spreading his fraudulent operations among a number
of jurisdictions, the boiler room operator decreases the likelihood
that any one law enforcement agency will recognize the magnitude of
the fraud.
V. IMPACT OF THE REGULATORY AGENCIES
A number of federal, state, and local agencies have a regulatory in-
terest in boiler rooms and commodity investment fraud. At the fed-
eral level, the agencies primarily involved are the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and to a
lesser extent, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). At the state level,
the regulatory agencies which are involved tend to be the State Se-
curities Commission, the State Corporations Commission and the
Secretary of State's office.
The investigation and hearings conducted by the Permanent Sub-
committee on Investigations from 1982 through 1984 demonstrated
that boiler rooms have flourished because they have been able to
take advantage of gaps in the federal-state law enforcement struc-
ture. At the state level, many of the regulatory agencies do not have
jurisdiction over the type of activity conducted by boiler rooms. The
criminal justice agencies are frequently hesitant to act because only
isolated victims are found within their respective jurisdictions. As a
15. See id at 149 (Staff Statement of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investiga-
tions of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs).
result, the local agency often does not see the full extent of the crim-
inal behavior. Even if the scheme is detected, the agency may hesi-
tate to expend scarce prosecutorial and investigative resources on an
out-of-state defendant. At the federal level, some of the principal
agencies do not have a jurisdictional base from which to proceed
against boiler rooms and others do not have the resources and/or ex-
pertise to proceed effectively.
A. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
The Commodity Exchange Act of 197416 created the CFTC as an
independent regulatory agency to oversee the trading of commodity
futures contracts. Prior to that time, the trading of futures contracts
on agricultural commodities was regulated by the Department of Ag-
riculture's Commodity Exchange Authority. The CFTC has exclu-
sive regulatory jurisdiction
with respect to accounts, agreements (including any transaction which is of
the character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, an "option", "privi-
lege", "indemnity", "bid", "offer", "put", "call", "advance guarantee", or "de-
dine guarantee"), and transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity
for future delivery, traded or executed on a contract market designated pursu-
ant to section 7 of... title [7, U.S.C.] or any other board of trade, exchange, or
market, and transactions subject to regulation by the Commission pursuant to
section 23 of ... title [7, U.S.C.] .... 17
"Commodity" is broadly defined in Title 7 of the United States
Code, section 2 to include "all... goods and articles ... and all serv-
ices, rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery are
presently or in the future dealt in . . . ."18 The term "commodity"
has "come to embrace a variety of financial instruments, precious
metals, and natural resource items, such as petroleum, as well as do-
mestic and international agricultural products."19 The term "future
delivery" as used in the definition of "commodity" does "not include
any sale of any cash commodity for deferred shipment or delivery."20
In deciding whether a contract is one involving the sale of a com-
modity for future delivery, over which the CFTC has exclusive regu-
latory jurisdiction, or a purchase of a cash commodity for deferred
delivery, over which the CFTC does not have jurisdiction, "no bright
16. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1982).
17. Id. § 2 (1982). See also CFTC v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573 (9th
Cir. 1982) (agency agreements are not "cash forward contracts" within the meaning of
the phrase "transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future deliv-
ery" as used in 7 U.S.C. § 2).
18. Co Petro Mktg., 680 F.2d at 577 n.3.
19. H.R. REP. No. 565, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 36, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3885.
20. Co Petro Mktg., 680 F.2d at 577 (for a deposit of a percentage of the purchase
price, the customer appointed the company as agent to buy and later sell specified
types and quantities of fuel for a set price).
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line definition or list of characterizing elements is determinative."2'
The transaction must be analyzed under a "totality of the facts and
circumstances with a critical eye towards its underlying purpose." 22
The key issue is whether there is an expectation of delivery of the
actual commodity by the seller to the original contracting buyer. The
exclusion from CFTC jurisdiction will generally not apply if the com-
modities are sold merely for speculative purposes and there is no ex-
pectation of actual delivery of the commodity to the original
contracting party.2 3
In some areas, it is not entirely clear whether an item is a commod-
ity future within the meaning of Title 7 of the United States Code, or
a security within the meaning of Title 15. The grant of exclusive ju-
risdiction to the CFTC over futures contracts involving intangible in-
terests created an "inevitable jurisdictional conflict with the SEC."24
"The investment vehicle which would create the greatest jurisdic-
tional problem would be a contract of sale for future delivery of
broad-based stock indices, colloquially known as a 'stock index fu-
ture.' The CFTC's new authority to regulate such investments was a
direct incursion on the SEC's regulatory turf."25
In 1981, the CFTC and SEC reached an agreement giving the
CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over the trading of futures contracts on
boards of trade. The agreement made the SEC the sole regulator of
securities options markets26 and the Futures Trading Act of 1982
codified the agreement between the two agencies. 27 This statutory
21. Id. at 581.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 579. See also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S.
353, 387 (1982) (exclusive CFTC jurisdiction is not intended to affect implied causes of
action as well as other causes of action); Mallen v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, 605 F. Supp. 1105, 1109-10 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (discretionary commodity account
giving broker authorization to speculate in "stock index futures" involves a "commod-
ity" rather than a "security" for purposes of administrative jurisdiction); NRT Metals,
Inc. v. Manhattan Metals (Non-Ferrous) Ltd., 576 F. Supp. 1046, 1050-51 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (cash forward contracts contemplate physical transfer of actual commodities and
not merely offsetting purchases). See generally Johnson, The Commodity Futures
Trading Commission Act: Preemption as Public Policy, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1, 11-16
(1976); Van Wart, Preemption and the Commodity Exchange Act, 58 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
657, 660-64 (1982).
24. Mallen, 605 F. Supp. at 1109-11.
25. Id.
26. S.E.C. and CFT.C. Jurisdictional Agreement- Proposed Legislation, [1981-1982
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83, 96 (Feb. 2, 1982).
27. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1982) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law-
(i) This chapter shall not apply to and the [Commodity Futures Trading]
split in jurisdiction means that in some cases it will be necessary to
determine whether to look to the CFTC and the commodities laws,
or to the SEC and the securities laws to determine which alternatives
to the fraud injunction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1345 are available.
Sections 6 through 6p of the Commodity Exchange Act28 outline
what constitutes violations of the Act. Of particular interest in the
context of boiler room operations are the following: sections 6d of the
Act,29 which prohibits a person from engaging as a futures commis-
sion merchant or introducing a broker unless registered with the
CFTC; section 6n,3 0 which makes it unlawful for any commodity
trading adviser or commodity pool operator to make any use of the
mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce in con-
nection with his/her business unless registered with the CFTC; and
section 6o,31 which makes it unlawful for a commodity trading advi-
sor, commodity pool operator, and any of their associates to use the
mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to use
any device or scheme to defraud any client or participant or to en-
gage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
as a fraud or deceit upon any client or participant. Section 6o is simi-
lar to the mail and wire fraud provisions of the criminal code,32 the
anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,33 and
Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission.34
The CFTC is authorized to seek an injunction prohibiting conduct
which violates any provision of the Act or rule of the Commission:
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any contract market or
other person has engaged, is engaging, or is about to engage in any act or prac-
tice constituting a violation of any provision of this chapter [Commodity Ex-
change Act] or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, or is restraining
trading in any commodity for future delivery, the Commission may bring an
action in the proper district court of the United States ... to enjoin such act
or practice, or to enforce compliance with this chapter, or any rule, regulation
Commission shall have no jurisdiction to designate a board of trade as a con-
tract market for any transaction whereby any party to such transaction ac-
quires any put, call, or other option on one or more securities (as defined in
section 77b(1) of title 15 or section 78c(a)(10) of title 15 on January 11, 1983),
including any group or index of such securities, or any interest therein or
based on the value thereof.
(ii) This chapter shall apply to and the commission shall have exclusive ju-
risdiction with respect to accounts, agreements... and transactions involving,
and may designate a board of trade as a contract market in, contracts of sale
(or options on such contracts) for future delivery of a group or index of securi-
ties (or any interest therein or based upon the value thereof) ....
Id,
28. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1982).
29. Id. § 6d.
30. Id. § 6.
31. Id. § 6o.
32. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1982).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
34. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983).
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or order thereunder, and said courts shall have jurisdiction to entertain such
actions. . Any action under this section may be brought in the district
wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business or in
the district where the acts or practice occurred, is occurring, or is about to oc-
cur, and process in such cases may be served in any district in which the de-
fendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found. In lieu of
bringing actions itself pursuant to this section, the Commission may request
the Attorney General to bring the action .... 35
Under the Commodity Exchange Act, when the CFTC agrees to such
a procedure, the Department of Justice or the United States Attor-
ney can choose between the injunctions pursuant to Title 18 of the
United States Code, section 1345,36 and Title 7 of the United States
Code, section 13a-1, 3 7 as a remedy for unlawful conduct by boiler
room operators.
Once a violation of the Act has been shown, the party moving for
injunctive relief need only show the existence of some reasonable
likelihood of future violations.38 This determination is based upon
the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant's past un-
lawful conduct. 39 In actions "brought to enforce the requirements of
remedial statutes such as [the Commodity Exchange] Act, the district
court has broad discretion to fashion appropriate relief,"40 including
relief ancillary to injunction, to effectuate the statutory purpose and
policy of the Act. Among the types of ancillary relief which have
been granted as a result of commodities violations are the appoint-
ment of a receiver,4 1 the temporary freezing of the violator's assets,42
35. 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1 (1982) (emphasis added).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1345 (1982).
37. 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1 (1982).
38. CFTC v. Skorupskas, 605 F. Supp. 923, 942 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
39. Id. at 942-43 (injunction proper where unregistered commodities broker oper-
ated fraudulent pyramid scheme); see also CFTC v. Morgan, Harris & Scott, Ltd., 484
F. Supp. 669, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (injunctive relief under 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1 does not re-
quire showing of irreparable harm or lack of adequate remedy at law as does relief in
private injunctive actions). Cf CFTC v. Commodities Fluctuations Sys., Inc., 583 F.
Supp. 1382, 1386 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (injunction denied when evidence failed to show rea-
sonable likelihood of continued violations).
40. CFTC v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 583-84 (9th Cir. 1982); Mor-
gan, Harris & Scott, 484 F. Supp. at 677 (quoting CFTC v. Muller, 570 F.2d 1296, 1300
(5th Cir. 1978)); see also CFTC v. Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211, 1223 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 921 (1979) (district court has power to compel disgorgement of profits from illegal
commodities transactions and to enjoin publication of trading positions); Kelly v. Carr,
567 F. Supp. 831, 838-40 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (judgment ordering disgorgement and ap-
pointment of receiver in addition to permanent injunction in case of boiler room com-
modities fraud on "massive scale"); CFTC v. United States Metals Depository Co., 468
F. Supp. 1149, 1161-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (granting of pre-sentence motion to withdraw
guilty plea is within the sound discretion of the trial court).
41. Co Petro Mktg., 680 F.2d at 583-84; Morgan, Harris & Scott, 484 F. Supp. at 677;
see also CFTC v. American Commodity Group Corp., 753 F.2d 862 (11th Cir. 1984)
and an accounting for any disgorgement of profits accumulated as a
result of the unlawful conduct. 43
B. Securities and Exchange Commission
The SEC was created by the Securities Exchange Act of 193444 as
an independent, bipartisan, quasi-judicial agency of the United States
Government. The laws administered by the Commission relate in
general to the field of securities and finance, and seek to provide pro-
tection for investors and the public in securities transactions. Among
the laws administered by the SEC are two which impact directly
upon the operation of boiler rooms. They are the Securities Act of
193345 (Securities Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Ex-
change Act).46
The Securities Act has two basic objectives: (a) to provide investors
with financial and other information concerning securities offered for
public sale; and (b) to prohibit misrepresentation, deceit, and other
fraudulent acts and practices in the sale of securities.47 The Ex-
change Act extended the concept of investor protection by requiring
disclosure of all relevant information about securities listed and reg-
istered for public trading on the national stock exchanges. The 1964
amendments to these Acts applied the disclosure and reporting provi-
sions to the over-the-counter market.48
In testimony before the Subcommittee, Mr. John Fedders, former
Director of the Enforcement Division of the SEC, indicated that the
SEC does not have jurisdiction over most boiler rooms, and particu-
larly not over those involving precious metals.
Though the Commission can bring enforcement actions in appropriate cases,
restrictions on its jurisdiction would, in most instances, preclude its action.
The Commission, as a general rule, does not have jurisdiction over precious
metals dealers. Though dealers may in some instances sell the metals as part
of a package that constitutes a "security"-most typically an "investment con-
tract"-the Commission generally has no authority to regulate precious met-
als dealers, and can determine whether it has jurisdiction over a particular
dealer only after a careful examination of that dealer's marketing plan. Con-
sequently, there is no basis for systematic Commission regulation of metals
(within discretion of trial court to enter default judgment against defendant for failure
to respond to motion by receiver to show cause why disgorgement of profits by related
individuals should not be compelled); CFTC v. Chilcott Portfolio Management, Inc.,
713 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir. 1983) (abuse of trial court's discretion to allow equity receiver
to stay federal and state court actions brought by investors as those actions would not
interfere with prosecution of receiver's action).
42. See, e.g., CFrC v. Skorupskas, 605 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Morgan,
Harris & Scott, 484 F. Supp. at 669.
43. See, e.g., Co Petro Mktg., 680 F.2d at 573; Skorupskas, 605 F. Supp. at 923.
44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982).
46. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
47. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, THE WORK OF THE SEC, 5-6 (Feb. 1984).
48. Id. at 10.
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dealers, as there is for issuing companies, broker-dealers, investment compa-
nies, investment advisors and others in the securities industry.
4 9
The Securities Act regulates public offerings of securities and pro-
hibits offers and sales of securities which are not registered with the
SEC, subject to exceptions provided by statute and regulations
promulgated by the Commission. It further prohibits fraudulent or
deceptive practices regarding the offer or sale of securities. In con-
trast, the Exchange Act applies to those securities which are already
issued and outstanding.50 The key issue, therefore, is whether the
items involved are securities. The Securities Act defines the term
''security" to include:
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,. . . certificate of interest or participation
in any profit-sharing agreement, ... investment contract... fractional undi-
vided interest in oil, gas or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of,
or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
5 1
Boiler room operators will usually not promote stocks, bonds, or any
other items described as a security in the Securities Act, with the
possible exception of investment contracts and/or fractional undi-
vided interests in oil, gas, or other mineral rights. "The mere sale
and delivery of a precious metal is not the sale of a security for pur-
poses of the federal securities laws.... Consequently, unless a metals
transaction involves an 'investment contract' or some other specified
security the Commission has no jurisdiction over the transaction."52
In S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., s3 the Supreme Court defined an in-
vestment contract as an investment of money in a common enterprise
49. Commodity Investment Fraud II, supra note 4, at 200.
50. D. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION § 2 (2d ed. 1984).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982) (emphasis added). This term is also defined by the
Exchange Act to include:
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or par-
ticipation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral
royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, reorganization certificate or
subscription, transferrable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit, for a security .... or in general, any instrument com-
monly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or participation in,
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to sub-
scribe to or purchase, any of the forgoing; but shall not include currency of
any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity
at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of
grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982) (emphasis added).
52. Commodity Investment Fraud II, supra note 4, at 201.
53. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). Defendants offered tracts of orange trees to investors
along with exclusive access service contracts. The practical effect of this was to make
purchasers investors in the large groves, not merely owners of small tracts. Id
with the profits from the investment to be derived solely from the
efforts of others.54
There is some authority for the position that promotions of a lim-
ited class of boiler room operations might qualify as a security under
the Securities Act.
The case law suggests that the sale of metals as part of a package together
with particular services provided by the dealer may constitute a security....
To constitute an "investment contract," the efforts of the promoter or other
person must be essential to the anticipated production of profits. There would
be no investment contract if these persons performed merely ministerial func-
tions unrelated to the production of profits. Thus, in the case of sales of pre-
cious metals, there probably would be no investment contract where the seller
agreed merely to store or insure the metals of the purchaser.
In a precious metals transaction where the dealer represents itself as an ex-
pert in metals trading and offers to provide the purchaser with expert invest-
ment advice, such as when to buy and sell, the offer of advice arguably is
material to the expected profit to be earned by the purchaser. This advice, to-
gether with other elements, may constitute sufficient managerial efforts to
transform the commodity sale into a securities transaction.
5 5
If it appears that the boiler room operator's sale of an interest in
the product qualifies as both the sale of a commodity under the Com-
modity Exchange Act56 and an investment contract, and thus a secur-
ity, under the Securities Act,57 the division of jurisdiction between
the CFTC and the SEC58 may affect whether a cause of action arises
under the commodities or securities laws.59 The grant of exclusive
jurisdiction to the CFTC regarding commodity violations may deprive
54. Id. at 298-99. This test has since been modified by the circuit courts to allow
them to find a security where some efforts are made by the investors to acquire or in-
crease profits. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852, reh'g denied,
423 U.S. 884 (1975) (holding that an investment contract is "an investment in a com-
mon venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others."); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter.,
Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). The proper test is not the
Howey test (solely from the efforts of others) but "a more realistic test, [which is]
whether the efforts made by those other than the investor are the undeniably signifi-
cant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the
enterprise." Id, at 482; SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974)
(holding that a pyramid selling scheme constitutes an investment contract notwith-
standing some efforts made on the part of investors).
55. Commodity Investment Fraud II, supra note 4, at 201-02 (statement by John
Fedders).
56. Commodity Exchange Act § 2(a), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). This section defines
"commodity" as "wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye, flaxseed, grain sorghams,
mill feeds, butter, eggs, solanun tuberasum (Irish potatoes), wool, wool tops, fats and
oils ... and all services, rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery are
presently or in future dealt in .... " Id
57. Securities Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982); see supra note 42 and accompany-
ing text.
58. 7 U.S.C. § 2a (1982); see also supra note 24.
59. See, e.g., Mallen v. Merrill Lynch, IAerce, Fenner and Smith, 605 F. Supp. 1105
(N.D. Ga. 1985) (stock index futures are commodities and not securities, thus investor
has no claim under federal or state securities laws).
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the court of subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a petition for in-
junctive relief under the Securities Act.60
If the product being promoted by the boiler room operator is a se-
curity, the registration6' and anti-fraud provisions62 of the Securities
Act and the Exchange Act are applicable. No security may be offered
or sold to the public unless it is registered with the SEC or meets one
of the exceptions to the registration requirement.6 3
Among the more prominent of those exceptions are transactions by
any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer,64 private
60. Id, at 1114.
61. Securities Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982); see supra note 49.
62. Id. § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77g (fraud in interstate transactions); id § 11, 15 U.S.C.§ 77k (material misstatement or omission in registration statement); id. § 12(2), 15
U.S.C. § 78 (manipulative or deceptive devices in purchase or sales); Rule lOb-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987) (material misstatement or omission in purchase or sales).
63. Section 5 of the Securities Act prohibits the sale of unregistered securities. It
provides:
(a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be un-
lawful for any person, directly or indirectly-
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communi-
cation in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security through the
use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate com-
merce, by any means or instruments of transportation, any such security for
the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly-
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communi-
cation in interstate commerce or of the mails to carry or transmit any prospec-
tus relating to any security with respect to which a registration statement has
been filed under this title, unless such prospectus meets the requirements of
section 10; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate com-
merce any such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale, un-
less accompanied or preceded by a prospectus that meets the requirements of
subsection (a) of section 10.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use of
any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or
medium of any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration
statement has been filed as to such security, or while the registration state-
ment is the subject of a refusal order or stop order or (prior to the effective
date of the registration statement) any public proceeding or examination
under section 8.
Securities Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982).
Exceptions to this requirement are set forth in the Securities Act, sections 3 and 4,
15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 77d (1982). These exceptions are further explained in rules promul-
gated by the SEC in Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-230.264 (1987), and Regulation
D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-230.506 (1987).
64. Securities Act § 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1982). "The provisions of section 5
shall not apply to... (1) transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter,
or dealer .... Id,
placements,65 small offerings, 6  and intrastate offerings.67 The anti-
fraud provision of the Securities Act prohibits the use of the mails or
any means of interstate transportation or communication to perpe-
trate a fraud upon a purchaser.68 Moreover, any willful violation of
the Securities Act or any rule or regulation of the SEC promulgated
pursuant to the Securities Act is a felony.69
In addition to the registration and anti-fraud provisions of the Se-
curities Act, the anti-fraud provision of the Exchange Act, section
10b, and the regulations thereunder, are particularly relevant to
boiler room fraud. Section 10b provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any fa-
cility of any national securities exchange ....
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
65. Id. § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2). "The provisions of section 5 shall not apply to...
(2) transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering .... " Id.
66. Id. § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b).
The Commission may from time to time by its rules and regulations, and sub-ject to such terms and conditions as may be prescribed therein, add any class
of securities to the securities exempted as provided in this section, if it finds
that the enforcement of this title with respect to such securities is not neces-
sary in the public interest and for the protection of investors by reason of the
small amount involved or the limited character of the public offering; but no
issue of securities shall be exempted under this subsection where the aggre-
gate amount at which such issue is offered to the public exceeds $5,000,000.
Id. (emphasis added).
67. Id. § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11).
Any security which is a part of an issue offered and sold only to persons resi-
dent within a single State or Territory, where the issuer of such security is a
person resident and doing business within or, if a corporation, incorporated by
and doing business within, such State or Territory.
Id.
68. Id. § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a).
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by
the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a ma-
terial fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
Id.
69. Id. § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x, which provides:
Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of this title or the
rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission under authority
thereof, or any person who willfully, in a registration statement filed under
this title, makes any untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state any
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the state-
ments therein not misleading, shall upon conviction be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Id.
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rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 7 0
The Commission has supplemented this by promulgating Rule 10b-
5,71 which acts as a "catch-all" provision designed to deal with those
fraudulent situations which are not specifically prohibited elsewhere.
As one commentator stated:
It applies to any purchase or sale by any person of any security. There are no
exemptions. It applies to securities which are registered under the 1934 Act,
or which are not so registered. It applies to publicly-held companies, to
closely-held companies, to any kind of entity which issues something that can
be called a "security." It even applies to "exempted securities," as defined in
SEA § 3(a)(12), (including federal, state and local government securities)
which are specifically exempted from certain other provisions of the Act. Be-
cause of this broad scope, the rule may be invoked in many situations in which
alternative remedies are made available (or are not made available) by appli-
cable provisions of federal securities laws and state securities or corporation
laws.
7 2
Rule 10b-5 is similar in concept and scope to the mail fraud and
wire fraud provisions of the criminal code.73 Among the activities of
70. Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
71. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987). This rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any fa-
cility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
72. D. RATNER, supra note 50, at 132.
73. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1982). Section 1341 provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to de-
fraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pre-
tenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange,
alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any
counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything
represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious
article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so
to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any
matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or
takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to
be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at
which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any
such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
Id § 1341. Section 1343 provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to de-
fraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pre-
tenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by
a boiler room operation which would violate Rule 10b-5 are false
statements about the assets of the corporation whose stock was being
marketed, false statements regarding the projected selling price of
the stock being sold, or a failure to disclose that the seller was en-
gaged as a market-maker for the stock being sold.74 A willful viola-
tion of any provision of the Exchange Act or the regulations
promulgated thereunder is also a felony.75
The SEC is authorized by Congress to seek an injunction prohibit-
ing conduct which violates any provision of the Securities Act, the
Exchange Act, or the rules and regulations promulgated thereun-
der.76 Once a violation of the securities laws has been shown, the
means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign
commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of
executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or im-
prisoned not more than five years, or both.
Id, § 1343.
74. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 676-81 (4th ed. 1977); see
also Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., Inc., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970) (failure of bro-
ker to disclose market maker status is omission of material fact); Berko v. Securities
and Exch. Comm'n, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963) (broker who knowingly relied upon
long distance telephone solicitation to sell stock in company he did not know was oper-
ating at a loss and who mailed out brochures that he should have known were mislead-
ing was acting in a boiler room operation and caused employer to lose broker dealer
license).
75. Exchange Act § 32, 15 U.S.C. 78ff (1982). The Exchange Act provides in part
that:
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this title (other than sec-
tion 78dd-1 of this title), or any rule or regulation thereunder the violation of
which is made unlawful or the observance of which is required under the
terms of this chapter, or, any person who willfully and knowingly makes, or
causes to be made, any statement in any application, report, or document re-
quired to be filed under this title or any rule or regulation thereunder or any
undertaking contained in a registration statement as provided in subsection
(d) of section 78 of this title or by any self-regulatory organization in connec-
tion with an application for membership or participation therein or to become
associated with a member thereof, which statement was false or misleading
with respect to any material fact, shall upon conviction be fined not more
than $100,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, except that
when such person is an exchange, a fine not exceeding $500,000 may be im-
posed; but no person shall be subject to imprisonment under this section for
the violation of any rule or regulation if he proves that he had no knowledge
of such rule or regulation.
76. Securities Act § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1982). The Securities Act provides in
part that:
(b) Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or
about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a
violation of the provisions of this title or of any rule or regulation prescribed
under authority thereof, it may in its discretion, bring an action in any district
court of the United States, United States court of any Territory, or the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia to enjoin such acts or prac-
tices, and upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary injunction or re-
straining order shall be granted without bond. The Commission may transmit
such evidence as may be available concerning such acts or practices to the At-
torney General who may, in his discretion, institute the necessary criminal
proceedings under this title. Any such criminal proceeding may be brought
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Commission must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the de-
fendant will engage in future violations before a court can order per-
manent injunctive relief.7 7 Voluntarily agreeing to refrain from the
unlawful conduct in the future will not preclude an injunction.7 8 As
one commentator stated:
The factors that courts have considered in determining the reasonable likeli-
hood of future violations are:
a. The egregiousness of the past violations.
b. The isolated or repeated nature of the violations.
c. The degree of scienter involved.
either in the district wherein the transmittal of the prospectus or security
complained of begins, or in the district wherein such prospectus or security is
received.
Id The Exchange Act § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1982) then provides:
(d) Injunction proceedings. Wherever it shall appear to the Commission that
any person is engaged or is about to engage in acts or practices constituting a
violation of any provision of this title, the rules or regulations thereunder, the
rules of a national securities exchange or registered securities association of
which such person is a member or a person associated with a member, the
rules of a registered clearing agency in which such person or the rules of the
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, it may in its discretion bring an ac-
tion in the proper district court of the United States, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia, or the United States courts of any
territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to en-
join such acts or practices, and upon a proper showing a permanent or tempo-
rary injunction or restraining order shall be granted without bond. The
Commission may transmit such evidence as may be available concerning such
acts or practices as may constitute a violation of any provision of this title or
the rules or regulations thereunder to the Attorney General, who may, in his
discretion, institute the necessary criminal proceedings under this title.
Id.
77. See SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053
(1985) (court enjoined employee of financial printing company from continuing to steal
and trade on information he was privy to in his work); SEC v. Youmens, 729 F.2d 413
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 507 (1984) (district court abused its discretion by fo-
cusing exclusively on fact that defendant had changed occupation to determine likeli-
hood of future violations); SEC v. Washington County Util. Dist., 676 F.2d 218 (6th Cir.
1982) (manager of utility district who failed to disclose "kickback" from underwriter
violated federal securities laws and could be enjoined); SEC v. Bonastia, 614 F.2d 908
(3d Cir. 1980) (district court abused its discretion by focusing primarily on fact that de-
fendant was no longer engaged in violations to determine need for injunction); SEC v.
Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978) (SEC must prove scienter in past violations to ob-
tain an injunction);' SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975)
(whether injunction should issue to prevent further violations depends on facts of each
case).
78. See SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1980) (promise of violator not to re-
peat acts will not preclude injunction as this would in turn establish a ritualistic dodge
.. and negate usefulness of provision); SEC v. Keracarp Indus., Inc., 575 F.2d 692 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978) (promise of violator to reform is relevant but not
conclusive in determining issue of need for injunction); SEC v. Management Dynamics,
Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975) (mere cessation of violation is not ipso facto sufficient
to avoid injunction).
d. The sincerity of the defendant's assurances, if any, against future
violations.
e. The defendant's recognition of the wrongful nature of his conduct.
f. The likelihood that the defendant's occupation will present opportunities
(or lack thereof) for future violations.
g. The defendant's age and health.
h. The lapse of time between the violations and the entering of judgment.
i. The effect of adverse consequences to defendant. 79
In actions brought to enforce remedial statutes such as the Securi-
ties Act and the Exchange Act, the district court has broad discretion
to fashion appropriate relief, including relief ancillary to injunction,
to effectuate the statutory purpose and policy of the Act.8 o
To combat securities violations, the courts have granted several
types of ancillary relief, some of which include disgorgement, 8 1 the
appointment of a receiver,8 2 and the impoundment of assets.
8 3
C. Internal Revenue Service
The IRS is not engaged in the investigation of boiler rooms per se.
However, there is an overlap between the investment fraud schemes
79. 2 W. MCLUCAs, R. MARSHMAN & J. DUBOW, REMEDIES AVAILABLE IN S.E.C.
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 865, 867-73 (1986) [hereinafter REMEDIES].
80. See SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053
(1985); Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 910 (1973) (district court has the power to order recission or restitution at re-
quest of the SEC where such ancillary equitable relief is necessary to effectuate statu-
tory purposes); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1103 (2d Cir. 1972)
(district court granted ancillary relief where it found violations of anti-fraud and pro-
spectus delivery requirements by stating: "[tihus, while neither the 1933 nor 1934 Acts
specifically authorize the ancillary relief granted in this case, '[i]t is for the federal
courts to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief where federally se-
cured rights are invaded.' "). Id. at 1103 (footnote omitted) (quoting J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964)); see also J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (fed-
eral courts must adjust their remedies to grant the necessary relief where federally
secured rights are invaded); Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288
(1960) (district court has power to order employer to make restitution or wages lost to
employees unlawfully discharged or discriminated against); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971) (court may require
insiders who made use of corporate information to benefit selves to make restitution of
profits).
81. See SEC v. Scott, 565 F. Supp. 1513 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 734 F.2d 118 (2d Cir.
1984) (per curiam) (disgorgement is proper where violations occur); SEC v. World
Gambling, 555 F. Supp. 930 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 742 F.2d 1440 (2d Cir. 1983) (securities
firm can be ordered to disgorge profits where permanent injunction would be inappro-
priate). For other cases which discuss disgorgment as a remedy, see SEC v. Materia,
745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
82. For cases which discuss appointment of a receiver as a remedy, see SEC v.
Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985); SEC v. Manor
Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972).
83. International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 932 (1974) (district court did not abuse power when it froze assets of holding com-
pany to prevent compounded fraud from sale of subsidiary stock fraudulently distrib-
uted as dividends). See also REMEDIES, supra note 78, at 880-81 (for miscellaneous
forms of relief).
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promoted by boiler room operators and unlawful tax schemes mar-
keted by tax shelter promoters. Unlawful tax schemes being passed
off as tax shelters by promoters are geared to a smaller portion of the
general public than a typical boiler room operation. Usually a tax-
payer has to be in the highest tax bracket in order for the investment
in the tax scheme to be economically attractive. Accordingly, the
universe of buyers is smaller and much more selective than that
available to boiler room operators. As a result, traditional boiler
room tactics are not as common in cases falling under IRS jurisdic-
tion as they are in cases falling under the jurisdiction of the CFTC,
SEC, FTC, FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) and Postal
Inspectors.
Notwithstanding this smaller and more economically cohesive uni-
verse of investors, however, the products being sold by abusive "tax
shelter" promoters and by boiler room operators may be very similar.
Tax shelter promoters sell interests in gold and silver mines, Jojoba
bean fields, gas and oil wells, cattle, shipping containers, and real es-
tate. Boiler room operators frequently sell the same things. Both
groups are limited only by the extent of their imaginations. The
criminality of the tax scheme usually arises because the items which
are the subject of the promotion are either sold to more than one
person, are substantially overvalued, or simply do not exist. The
criminality of boiler room operations is frequently illegal for the
same reasons.
Many boiler room promotions are marketed as business invest-
ments which frequently appear on the purchasers' tax return, result-
ing in a double violation. For example, when a boiler room operator
sells an investor an interest in a non-existent gold mine, not only
does the operation defraud the investor of the purchase price, but the
operator may also be guilty of a felony for aiding and assisting the
investor in the filing of a materially false tax return in violation of
tax laws.84 This violation may also arise when boiler room operators
conspire to sell undivided interests in oil and gas wells which do not
84. 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) (1982). The statute provides in pertinent part:
Any person who-
Willfully aids or assists in, or procures, counsels, or advises the preparation or
presentation under, or in connection with any matter arising under, the inter-
nal revenue laws, of a return, affidavit, claim, or other document, which is
fraudulent or is false as to any material matter, whether or not such falsity or
fraud is with the knowledge or consent of the person authorized or required
to present such return, affidavit, claim or document; . . . shall be guilty of a
felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or im-
exist. They not only sell a security within the meaning of section
2(1) of the Securities Act, they may also be guilty of conspiring to ob-
struct or impede the lawful operations of the IRS in the assessment
and collection of tax.85 In short, a fraudulent investment scheme
may be within the jurisdiction of the IRS as well as the CFTC, SEC
and/or FTC.
Two injunction proceedings exist under the Internal Revenue Code
which may be available to the government in these cases. One arises
in cases where the promoter is promoting abusive tax shelters or en-
gaged in conduct which leads to the aiding and abetting of the inves-
tor in the understatement of tax liability and such injunctive relief is
appropriate to prevent that conduct.86
prisoned not more than 3 years, or both, together with the costs of
prosecution.
Id.
85. Criminal Law Act § 371, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982).
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the
United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any
manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to
effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspir-
acy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not ex-
ceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor.
Id. See United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 924
(1958) (parties found to have organized 17 foreign corporations to hide income and
evade taxes under 18 U.S.C. § 321).
86. A promoter who markets abusive tax shelters violates 26 U.S.C. § 6700 (1982),
which penalizes any person who makes or furnishes a statement with respect to the
allowability of any deduction or credit, the excludability of any income, or the securing
of a tax benefit which the person knows or has reason to know is false or fraudulent
with regard to a material matter, or who makes or furnishes a valuation with regard to
a material matter which exceeds 200% of the amount determined to be correct. Id.
§ 6700(a)-(b)(1).
A promoter who aids and abets the investor in the underpayment of their tax liabil-
ity violates 26 U.S.C. § 6701 (1982), which penalizes any person who aids, assists, pro-
cures, or advises with respect to the preparation or presentation of a return or other
document, knowing that the document will be used with regard to a material matter
under the internal revenue laws, and knowing that the document would cause an un-
derstatement of tax due from another person. Id. § 6701(a).
The injunction, for violation of these two sections, would be issued pursuant to 26
U.S.C. § 7408, which provides:
(a) Authority to seek injunction.
A civil action in the name of the United States to enjoin any person from
further engaging in conduct subject to penalty under section 6700 (relating to
penalty for promoting abusive tax shelters, etc.) or section 6701 (relating to
penalties for aiding and abetting understatement of tax liability) may be com-
menced at the request of the Secretary. Any action under this section shall be
brought in the district court of the United States for the district in which such
person resides, has his principal place of business, or has engaged in conduct
subject to penalty under section 6700 or section 6701. The court may exercise
its jurisdiction over such action (as provided in section 7402(a)) separate and
apart from any other action brought by the United States against such person.
(b) Adjudication and decree.
In any action under subsection (a), if the court finds-
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An injunction is also authorized "as may be necessary or appropri-
ate for the enforcement of the internal revenue laws."87 This lan-
guage grants the court a broad range of powers necessary to compel
compliance with the tax laws.88
(1) that the person has engaged in any conduct subject to penalty under sec-
tion 6700 (relating to penalty for promoting abusive tax shelters, etc.) or sec-
tion 6701 (relating to penalties for aiding and abetting understatement of tax
liability), and
(2) that injunctive relief is appropriate to prevent recurrence of such conduct,
the court may enjoin such person from engaging in such conduct or in any
other activity subject to penalty under section 6700 or section 6701.
(c) Citizens and residents outside the United States.
If any citizen or resident of the United States does not reside in, and does
not have his principal place of business in, any United States judicial district,
such citizen or resident shall be treated for purposes of this section as residing
in the District of Columbia.
26 U.S.C. § 7408 (1982). See United States v. White, 769 F.2d 511 (8th Cir. 1985) (in-
junction under section 7408 was proper remedy to prevent defendant from continuing
sales of tax avoidance plan that contained false representation about deductibility);
United States v. Buttorff, 761 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1985) (injunction under section 7408
was proper to prevent promoter from continuing to sell "pure equity" trust that was
actually a sham with no tax benefits); United States v. Philatelic Leasing, Ltd., 601 F.
Supp. 1554 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), off'd, 794 F.2d 781 (2d Cir. 1986) (court could enjoin pro-
moters from continued sales of tax shelter where they grossly overvalued "stamp mas-
ters"); United States v. Turner, 601 F. Supp. 757 (E.D. Wis.), cff'd, 787 F.2d 595 (7th
Cir. 1985) (injunction under section 7408 was proper to prevent promoter from future
sales of overvalued energy management systems given promoter's history of involve-
ment in such schemes); United States v. Savoie, 594 F. Supp. 678 (D. La. 1984) (injunc-
tion under section 7408 was proper to prevent defendant and club from preparing taxes
and using tax-evasion plan).
87. 26 U.S.C. § 7402(a) (1982). This section provides:
The district courts of the United States at the instance of the United States
shall have such jurisdiction to make and issue in civil actions, writs, and or-
ders of injunction, and of ne exeat republica, orders appointing receivers, and
such other orders and processes, and to render such judgments and decrees as
may be necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the internal revenue
laws. The remedies hereby provided are in addition to and not exclusive of
any and all other remedies of the United States in such courts or otherwise to
enforce such laws.
Id,
88. See United States v. Ernst and Whinney, 735 F.2d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir. 1984)
("language of § 7402(a) encompasses a broad range of powers necessary to compel com-
pliance with the tax laws."); United States v. Landsberger, 692 F.2d 501 (8th Cir. 1982)
(injunction granted to prevent tax haven scheme where taxpayer assigned all future
income to organization that gifted back 90% of proceeds); United States v. May, 555 F.
Supp. 1008 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (injunction proper to prevent tax protestor from distrib-
uting an "alternative tax form" which differed from official form); see also United
States v. Ekblad, 732 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1984) (section 7402(a) used to enjoin individuals
from harassing IRS agents in effort to hinder their effectiveness); United States v.
Hart, 701 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1983) (declaratory injunctive relief proper to prevent au-
dited defendant from continuing to file and record "common law liens" as real prop-
erty of IRS employee and from "arresting" agents); United States v. First Nat'l City
Bank, 568 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1977) (taxpayer not entitled to intervene and prevent IRS
D. State and Local Governments
The Commodity Exchange Acts9 preempted state authority in the
area of commodity regulation, thereby forcing a number of states to
repeal or ignore their commodity statutes. A number of subsequent
amendments to the Act, including the Futures Trading Act of 1982,90
removed this federal preemption. The states are now free to add leg-
islative provisions to fill gaps which previously prevented their ade-
quate policing of off-exchange commodity fraud. The Futures
Trading Act specifically permits the application of other federal and
state laws to illegal commodity activities and persons who unlawfully
engage in commodity transactions outside the Act's regulatory struc-
ture.91 Also under the Act, the states are authorized to take either
administrative or judicial action against persons selling off-exchange
commodity investments, including sales of precious and strategic
metals.92
A number of states have modified their statutes to provide for en-
forcement in the commodities and boiler room areas. For example,
Florida, in 1984, amended its Securities Act, now known as the Flor-
ida Securities and Investor Protection Act 93 (Florida Act), extending
state regulation to boiler rooms and commodity fraud. Under the
Florida Act, it is unlawful to "directly or indirectly manage, super-
vise, control, or own, either alone or in association with others, any
boiler room in this state which sells or offers to sell any security or
investment [by means of fraud or misrepresentation]."94 A "Boiler
Room" is defined under the statute to mean "an enterprise in which
two or more persons engage in telephone communications with mem-
bers of the public using two or more telephones at one location, or at
more than one location in a common scheme or enterprise."9 5 Both
security and investment are defined under the statute.9 6
from enforcing levy against nonexempt contents of safe deposit box); United States v.
Van Dyke, 568 F. Supp. 820 (D. Or. 1983) (injunction proper to prevent tax protestors
from harassing IRS employee by filing "common law liens" against them).
89. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1982).
90. Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (1983) (codified in scattered sections of 7
U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
91. Futures Trading Act of 1982, § 12(e), codified in relevant part at 7 U.S.C.
§ 16(e); see also Commodity Investment Fraud II, supra note 4 at 155.
92. Futures Trading Act of 1982, § 12(e), codified in relevant part at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2,
13a-2(8)(A); see also Commodity Investment Fraud II, supra note 91.
93. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 517.011 -.32 (West Supp. 1987).
94. Id. § 517.312(1)(b).
95. Id. § 517.021(5).
96. Section 517.021(21) defines "security" to include:
(a) A note.
(b) A stock.
(c) A treasury stock.
(d) A bond.
(e) A debenture.
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Further, the Florida Act makes it unlawful for any person to en-
gage, either in or from the State of Florida, in any act or practice con-
stituting a violation of any provision of the federal Commodity
Exchange Act or the rules and regulations of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission,97 or to offer, sell, or purchase any security or
investment by means of fraud,98 or to falsely represent that either
the investment or person selling the investment is approved by the
State of Florida or by the United States. 99
New York has recently enacted legislation which is in substance a
boiler room registration law.10o The New York statute' 01 defines a
newly created term, "commodity contract,"102 and provides that it is
unlawful to engage in business as a "commodity broker-dealer, com-
modity salesperson or commodity investment advisor" unless regis-
tered in New York as suchlO3 or otherwise excluded from the
registration requirement. 0 4 Those excluded from the state registra-
(f) An evidence of indebtedness.
(g) A certificate of deposit.
(h) A certificate of deposit for a security.
(i) A certificate of interest or participation.
(j) A whiskey warehouse receipt or other commodity warehouse receipt.
(k) A certificate of interest in a profit-sharing agreement or the right to par-
ticipate therein.
(1) A certificate of interest in an oil, gas, petroleum, mineral, or mining title
or lease or the right to participate therein.
(m) A collateral trust certificate.
(n) A reorganization certificate.
(o) A reorganization subscription.
(p) Any transferable share.
(q) An investment contract.
(r) A beneficial interest in title to property, profits, or earnings.
(s) An interest in or under a profit-sharing or participation agreement or
scheme.
(t) Any option contract which entitles the holder to purchase or sell a given
amount of the underlying security at a fixed price within a specified period of
time.
(u) Any other instrument commonly known as a security, including an in-
terim or temporary bond, debenture, note, or certificate.
(v) Any receipt for a security, or for subscription to a security, or any right to
subscribe to or purchase any security.
Id, § 517.021(21). Section 517.021(10) defines "investment" as any commitment of
money or property in expectation of receiving an economic benefit. Id. § 517.021(10).
97. Id § 517.275.
98. Id. § 517.301(1).
99. Id § 517.311(3).
100. See 1984 N.Y. Laws 810.
101. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 359-e (McKinney Supp. 1988).
102. Id § 359-e 14(a)(ii).
103. Id. § 359-e 14(b).
104. Id §§ 359-e 14(g), (h).
tion requirement are generally those individuals or entities who are
either registered with the CFTC or SEC, or are exempt from regis-
tration under the regulations of those agencies. 105
California has enacted a provision which makes it unlawful to op-
erate a boiler room or other telecommunications solicitation efforts
without filing a registration statement with the consumer law section
of the Department of Justice.10 6
VI. SPECIAL PROBLEMS INHERENT IN DEVELOPING AN OPERATIONAL
PLAN FOR CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT
Boiler room operators are a loose-knit organization of criminals
who know each other, teach each other, and have previously been in-
volved with each other in other kinds of fraudulent schemes, fre-
quently from the heyday of "hot stock" manipulation in the late
1960's and early 1970's. No single judicial district can begin to man-
age the problem, which is virulent both in its rapid spread and direct
impact on far-flung, large numbers of the public. There are several
reasons for this:
First, a boiler room operation is incredibly easy to set up. All the
operation needs is a bank of telephones, a list of consumers, a script
and a relationship with a financial institution. The financial connec-
tion can be arranged through a wholly innocent bank with a cooper-
ating inside officer, or a phony bank.
Second, a boiler room operation does not take the brains, or the
planning, or the trigger-fast coordination which are the hallmarks of
sophisticated stock manipulations. Any fast-talking swindler can pull
it off.
Third, the victims are not concentrated geographically nor by any
particular interest, such as an interest in specialized securities mar-
kets. In fact, the swindlers, by simple list selection, can put as much
distance between their operational centers and the victims as they
choose. Similarly, they can reduce the impact of their scheme in any
particular locale by scattering their calls and thus minimizing the
chances that any particular local law enforcement agency will be mo-
tivated to strike back.
Fourth, the operation provides instant gratification-money di-
rectly from the victim-in relatively small amounts. The small
amounts are another guarantee that no local enforcement agency will
mobilize against the operators, particularly if they are operating half-
way across the country. The direct payment from victims to pro-
moter avoids hazards of the older types of market manipulation,
105. Id
106. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.3(a) (West Supp. 1988).
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where a few false steps could bring the walls caving in on the pro-
moters before they took their profit out.
Fifth, these kinds of operations avoid triggering a massive federal
response for the simple reason that the scheme does not undermine
the integrity of a national institution such as the stock market, but
instead merely collects small amounts from isolated individuals.
Sixth, boiler rooms are essentially unregulated and entirely mobile.
When the investigations by law enforcement warm up, the operations
can be unplugged overnight, moved to the safety of a cooler jurisdic-
tion, and opened under a different corporate name in a matter of
days.
Finally, on the surface, the operations appear even more complex
than the old stock fraud cases. This gives swindlers a sense of secur-
ity and encourages the proliferation of the business.
VII. THE INJUNCTION AGAINST FRAuD-18 U.S.C. § 1345
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act107 was passed in 1984, per-
mitting the government to seek injunctions against activities associ-
ated with mail fraud,lO8 wire fraud,10 9 and bank fraud.110 The statute
states that:
Whenever it shall appear that any person is engaged or is about to engage in
any act which constitutes or will constitute a violation of this chapter [Chap-
ter 63 of Title 18, comprising sections 1341-1345], the Attorney General may
initiate a civil proceeding in a district court of the United States to enjoin such
violation. The court shall proceed as soon as practicable to the hearing and
the determination of such an action, and may, at any time before final deter-
mination, enter such a restraining order or prohibition, or take such other ac-
tion, as is warranted to prevent a continuing and substantial injury to the
United States or to any person or class of persons for whose protection the
action is brought. A proceeding under this section is governed by the Federal
107. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.).
108. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1984). The Act provides that:
[w]hoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme of artifice to de-
fraud.., for the purpose of executing such scheme... places ... any matter
or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service .. . shall be
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
109. Id, § 1343. "Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or ar-
tifice to defraud ... transmits... by means of wire... [any communication] ... for the
purpose of executing such scheme... shall be fined not more than $1,000 or impris-
oned not more than five years, or both." Id,
110. Id § 1344. "Whoever knowingly executes ... a scheme ... to defraud a feder-
ally chartered or insured financial institution; or (2) to obtain ... assets ... of [such]
financial institution by [fraud] . . . shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both." Id,
Rules of Civil Procedure, except that, if an indictment has been returned
against the respondent, discovery is governed by the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure.1 1 1
A. Scope of the Statute
Upon a showing by the Attorney General that a person is engaged
in, or about to engage in, mail, wire, and/or bank fraud, section 1345
permits a federal district court to issue a civil injunction, restraining
order, prohibition, or to take any other action which is warranted to
prevent a continuing and substantial injury to the government or the
public resulting from the violation."i 2
The purpose of this statute is to provide prosecutors with an effec-
tive tool to prevent the continuation of a fraudulent scheme during
the pendency of the investigation."i
3
Another area where there is a great need for injunctive relief is in fraudu-
lent scheme cases. While present law provides limited injunctive relief, this
relief is inadequate. First, the relief is restricted to the detention of incoming
mail. It does not reach the situation where letters continue to be sent to fur-
ther a scheme and remittances are collected personally from the customer or
to fraudulent schemes which do not entail the use of the mails. Second, the
required administrative proceedings entail considerable delay which is com-
pounded by the extra time and energy necessary to bring an injunctive suit in
the district court while the administrative proceedings are pending. Since the
investigation of fraudulent schemes often takes months, if not years, before
the case is ready for criminal prosecution, innocent people continue to be vic-
timized while the investigation is in progress.
Experience has shown that even after indictment or the obtaining of a con-
viction, the perpetrators of fraudulent schemes continue to victimize the
public.1 1 4
B. Jurisdiction and Venue
Jurisdiction of the federal courts to enjoin fraudulent boiler room
operations has been authorized by Congress."i 5 This grant of district
court jurisdiction over civil actions commenced by the United States
is without regard to the subject matter of the litigation."x 6 The
111. Id. § 1345.
112. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, HANDBOOK ON THE COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CON-
TROL ACT OF 1984 AND OTHER CRIMINAL STATUTES ENACTED By THE 98TH CONGRESS
152 (Dec. 1984).
113. Id.
114. S. REP. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 401-02, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3539-40 (citations omitted).
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1982). "Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings
commenced by the United States, or by any agency or officer thereof expressly author-
ized to sue by Act of Congress." Id.
116. See United States v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 551 F. Supp. 864 (D.P.R.
1982), aff'd, 721 F.2d 832 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding that 28 U.S.C. section 1345 governs
the federal government's access to the district courts unless Congress preempts this
statute in certain cases by specific statute); see also United States v. Morchetti, 466 F.2d
1309 (4th Cir.), cerL denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972) (federal district court has jurisdiction
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United States can bring suit "to protect its sovereign interest
notwithstanding the lack of any immediate pecuniary interest in the
outcome of the litigation."n17 This congressional authority also pro-
vides for jurisdiction over actions in which the United States seeks
injunctive relief.118
Venue will lie in the judicial district in which all the defendants
reside or in which the cause of action arose.119 Typically, a boiler
room operation has a business location in one judicial district, but so-
licits victims from a large number of other judicial districts. If the
United States brings the action in either the judicial district in which
the defendants live, or the judicial district in which the boiler room is
located, the court's venue requirement would clearly be satisfied.12 O
Venue is not so clear, however, when the United States seeks to
bring the action in other judicial districts. The Northern District of
of cases in which the United States is a party); Williams v. United States, 42 F.R.D. 609
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (federal district courts have original jurisdiction, regardless of subject
matter of any proceeding commenced by the United States against a state).
117. United States v. Lewisburgh Area School Dist., 539 F.2d 301, 305 (3d Cir. 1976)
(United States had standing to apply to federal court to determine whether the actions
of local taxing bodies violated its sovereign rights); Cf United States v. Allegheny
County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944) (Pennsylvania law held unconstitutional because it author-
ized taxation of property interests of the United States which violated the federal gov-
ernment's sovereignty).
118. United States v. Baylor Univ. Medical Center, 564 F. Supp. 1495 (N.D. Tex.
1983), off'd, 736 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985) (federal
district court jurisdiction created when the United States sued Baylor to enforce com-
pliance with regulations imposed by Baylor's receipt of Medicare and Medicaid pay-
ments); see also United States v. Midwest Solvent Recovery, Inc., 484. F. Supp. 138
(N.D. Ind. 1980) (United States suing to enjoin defendant's handling of waste disposal
satisfied district court jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1345); United States v.
McGee, 432 F. Supp. 557 (S.D. Ohio 1977), off'd, 611 F.2d 375 (6th Cir. 1983) (federal
district court had jurisdiction over civil action commenced by United States to enjoin
City of Dayton from exercising any municipal powers over land used as a United
States Air Force base); United States v. Interlake, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Ill. 1977)
(federal district court had jurisdiction over civil action commenced by United States to
enjoin defendant from operating by-product coke production facility in violation of
Clean Air Act); United States v. Virginia Elec. and Power Co., 412 F. Supp. 165
(E.D.N.Y. 1976) (federal district court had jurisdiction over civil action by United
States to enjoin electric utility from discontinuing electrical service to coast guard air
base).
119. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1976).
120. See Johnson Creative Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 1106 (D.
Mass. 1983), off'd, 743 F.2d 947 (1st Cir. 1984). The federal district court in Massachu-
setts was improper venue for a civil suit brought against a defendant corporation lo-
cated in New York that merely solicited business and received orders and payments
for goods shipped to Massachusetts. Id. Venue would be proper, however, in the
Southern District of New York where the defendant corporation made decisions and
conducted corporate activity. Id.
Illinois has successfully engaged in an enforcement program based
upon "victim venue."121 For criminal venue purposes, venue would
lie in the victim's district, that is, the district in which the offense is
"begun, continued, or completed."'122 The rationale for this is that
the victim receives a wire communication or mail delivery from the
defendant and thereafter places money, checks, or other things of
value into the mails or other means of transportation in interstate
commerce for delivery to the defendants in their home districts.
Therefore, the government should take the position that venue is
appropriate for a section 1345 injunction in any district in which
venue is appropriate to prosecute for mail or wire fraud. It makes no
sense to conclude that the defendant could be prosecuted for mail or
wire fraud in one district, but that the petition to enjoin that fraud
must be brought in another district.
The cases which have been decided under the civil venue statute,
however, suggest a contrary result. "The phrase, 'in which the claim
arose' is simpler in its statement than in its operation."123 Generally,
three principal standards have been used by the federal courts to de-
termine where the action arose: "(1) The place of the injury rule; (2)
The weight of the contacts rule; and (3) The rule which turns on
whether a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to
the claim occurred in the district."124
"The place of the injury test deems that the claim arises in the dis-
trict in which the plaintiff's injuries were suffered, i.e., where the ef-
fect of the defendants' alleged wrongful act occurred."125 However,
in Leroy v. Great Western United Corp.,126 the Supreme Court re-
121. See Senderowitz, "Victim Venue" Boilerroom Solution?, FUTURES MAG., Feb.
1984.
122. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (Supp. III 1985). "[A]ny offense against the United States
begun in one district and completed in another, or completed in more than one district,
may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district in which such offense was begun,
continued, or completed." Id.
123. Soper v. Simmons Int'l Ltd., 582 F. Supp. 987, 990 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (district
court held conspiracy cause of action was properly pleaded under the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act, but transferred the case as venue was improper
due to defendant's lack of contacts with the district).
124. Hodson v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 528 F. Supp. 809, 813 (E.D. Va. 1981) (in an
English citizens' products liability suit for injuries allegedly caused by intrauterine
contraceptive device manufactured by defendant, venue was properly in Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia where decisions concerning the device and its manufacturing oc-
curred), aqf'd, 715 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1983) (citing Cochrane v. Iowa Beef Processors,
Inc., 596 F.2d 254, 260-61 (8th Cir.) (two attorneys sued defendant for abuse of process;
the court consolidated the cases and found venue to properly exist in Iowa for one
plaintiff and in Minnesota for the other), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979); see also 15 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3806 (1976 &
Supp. 1980).
125. Hodson, 528 F. Supp. at 813.
126. 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
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jected the "place of injury" approach, and seems to have adopted the
"weight of the contacts" test.
The statute allows venue "in the judicial district... in which the claim arose."
Without deciding whether this language adopts the occasionally fictive as-
sumption that a claim may arise in only one district, it is absolutely clear that
Congress did not intend to provide for venue at the residence of the plaintiff
or to give that party an unfettered choice among a host of different districts.
Rather, it restricted venue either to the residence of the defendants or to "a
place which may be more convenient to the litigants"-i.e., both of them-"or
to the witnesses who are to testify in the case." In our view, therefore, the
broadest interpretation of the language of § 1391(b) that is even arguably ac-
ceptable is that in the unusual case in which it is not clear that the claim
arose in only one specific district, a plaintiff may choose between those two
(or conceivably even more) districts that with approximately equal plausibil-
ity-in terms of the availability of the witnesses, the accessibility of other rel-
evant evidence, and the convenience to the defendant (but not of the
plaintiff)-may be assigned as the locus of the claim.1 2 7
The majority of the courts have adopted the "weight of the con-
tacts" test for determining where the action arose.128 "Leroy ac-
knowledged that a claim may arise in more than one district .... "129
Leroy requires that each of the districts under consideration be
equally plausible, however.' 30 The resulting test is a combination of
the "substantial part of the events" test (allowing venue in a district
with a relatively minor amount of activity in preference to a number
of other districts with greater activity) and the strict "weight of the
contacts" test (limiting the choice of venue to only one district). Ac-
cordingly, not only must venue be in a district which had a substan-
tial amount of activity, but there may not be any other district(s)
with substantially more activity.
Venue based upon doing business within the district may not rest
upon the "minimum contacts" test of International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington.'31 The defendant's business activities in the forum judicial
district must comprise substantially more than minimal contacts. 3 2
For example, venue in Massachusetts was not proper where defend-
ant's sales in Massachusetts constituted only six percent of its total
sales and nothing distinguished Massachusetts from thirty-four other
127. Id. at 184-85 (citations omitted).
128. See Soper v. Simmons Int'l Ltd., 582 F. Supp. 987, 991 (N.D.N.Y. 1983).
129. Id. at 992.
130. 443 U.S. at 185.
131. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
132. See, e.g., Johnson Creative Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 1106
(D. Mass. 1983), qff'd, 743 F.2d 947 (1st Cir. 1984) (venue proper in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York where the defendant corporation made decisions and conducted cor-
porate activity but not in Massachusetts where defendant merely solicited business and
received orders and payments for goods).
states in which the defendant sold its products.1ss Likewise, where a
Massachusetts corporation derived only two percent of its total in-
come (amounting to $1,500) from its sales territory in New York, did
not maintain a place of business in New York, and made only four
visits per year to New York, venue was not appropriate in New
York.134 Conversely, where a California banking corporation had
solicited and transacted business in Indiana, including the solicitation
and execution of certificates of deposit representing promises to pay
Indiana residents, mailed certificates and interest checks to Indiana,
issued cashier's checks to Indiana residents, and where Indiana was a
more convenient location for most witnesses, venue was appropriate
in the Northern District of Indiana.i35 Also, where a publisher of a
trade journal, whose principal place of business was in Massachu-
setts, directly distributed between five and seven percent of its jour-
nals to Pennsylvania and regularly solicited Pennsylvania businesses
to place advertising in its journal, venue was appropriate in
Pennsylvania.136
Accordingly, if the government proceeds on a "victim venue" the-
ory in a section 1345 proceeding, it should anticipate a challenge to
venue. Even though a statute allows venue where "the claim
arose,"137 it is not entirely clear that if a boiler room is located in Los
Angeles and has one or two victims in Massachusetts whether venue
is appropriate in the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiff has the
burden of establishing that venue is appropriate and the government
must be prepared to establish that venue in Massachusetts is equally
as plausible as venue in the Central District of California.
C. Basis for the Temporary Restraining Order
Injunctive relief applicants may occasionally face irreparable injury
before the hearing for a preliminary injunction occurs pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a).13 8 A temporary restraining
order (TRO), however, may be available in such circumstances under
Rule 65(b) to "preserve the status quo until there is an opportunity
to hold a hearing on the application for a preliminary injunction and
may be issued with or without notice to the adverse party."139 Where
133. Id at 1112.
134. Stark Carpet Corp. v. M-Geough Robinson, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 499, 502-04
(N.D.N.Y. 1980).
135. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc. v. South-Coast Bank, 587 F. Supp. 339, 346-47 (N.D. Ind.
1984).
136. CES Publishing Corp. v. Dealerscope, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 656, 660-61 (E.D. Pa.
1982).
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1976).
138. 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2951 (1973)
[hereinafter C. WRIGHT].
139. Id
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granted, the goal of the TRO "should be restricted to serving their
underlying purpose of preserving the status quo and preventing ir-
reparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no
longer."140
A TRO may be granted without notice to the adverse party or his
attorney only if (1) it is clear from the verified complaint or the sup-
porting affidavit that "immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or
damage will result to the applicant before ... [he] can be heard in
opposition" 14 1 and (2) the applicant's attorney certifies in writing
what efforts have been made to give notice to the adverse party and
why notice should not be required.142 The TRO may last no more
than ten days;143 however, where good cause is shown, it may be ex-
tended for a second ten-day period.144 Even if notice is given to the
adverse party, the applicant must show immediate and irreparable in-
jury before the court will grant the order.145
It thus follows that a showing of immediate and irreparable injury
would also be required in cases where notice is not given. In addi-
tion, some courts require the applicant to demonstrate not only a rea-
sonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits, but also that the harm
in not granting the applicant's restraining order outweighs any possi-
ble harm to the defendant or the public by granting the injunction.146
The evaluation of these factors and the grant or denial of the TRO
rests within the discretion of the trial judge.147
140. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 170, 415 U.S. 423,
439 (1974).
141. FED. R. CIv. P. 65(b)(1).
142. Id. 65(b)(2).
143. Id. 65(b).
144. I&
145. C=f. National Prisoners Reform Ass'n v. Sharkey, 347 F. Supp. 1234, 1236-37
(D.R.I. 1972) (in an ex parte hearing, temporary restraining order (TRO) not granted
because of public interest, but the court does not imply that the "immediate and irrep-
arable injury" requirement would be disregarded if the ex parte TRO were granted).
146. Garcia v. United States, 680 F.2d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1982) (must show likelihood of
success on the merits, irreparable harm, and that irreparable harm outweighs harm to
defendant); Martin v. Attaway, 506 F. Supp. 603, 606 (S.D. Ga. 1981) ("[Hlarm to plain-
tiff outweighs any possible harm to the defendants and to the public .... ); Salomon
North Am., Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 846, 848 (D. Mass. 1980) (must show both
likelihood of success on the merits and that plaintiff's harm outweighs defendant's);
National Prisoners Reform Ass'n, 347 F. Supp. at 1236-37 (applicant must show imme-
diate and irreparable harm, probability of success on the merits, and that movant's
harm outweighs harm to opposing party and public).
147. Coin-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc., 458 F.2d 1341, 1342 (6th Cir. 1972);
Martin, 506 F. Supp. at 606; MLZ, Inc. v. Fourco Glass Co., 470 F. Supp. 273, 276 (E.D.
Tenn. 1978); C. WRIGHT supra note 138, at 507.
Where notice is given to the adverse party and there is a hearing
on the petition, the proceeding is similar to an application for a pre-
liminary injunction.148 "If there is an adversary hearing or the order
is entered for an indeterminate length of time, the 'temporary re-
straining order' may be treated as a preliminary injunction."149
There is some basis for the position that a TRO should not be
treated as a preliminary injunction unless the adverse party consents.
By its terms Rule 65(b) only governs restraining orders issued without notice
or a hearing. However... it has been argued that its provisions, at least with
regard to the duration of a restraining order, apply even to an order granted
when notice has been given to the adverse party but there has been no hear-
ing. This appears to be a sound exercise of judicial discretion, particularly in
those situations in which simply giving notice should not justify treating the
order as a preliminary injunction since the time constraints do not allow the
parties to prepare adequately for a hearing.1 5 0
Therefore, the affidavit supporting the government's application
should establish that the boiler room operator is engaged in mail or
wire fraud and that the public will be irreparably harmed unless the
boiler room activities are terminated. The restraining order should
preserve the status quo, i.e., the public's enjoyment of money and
property without fraud. In other words, it is the pre-boiler room sta-
tus to be maintained. The restraining order will clearly have an ad-
verse affect upon the operator as "business" activities will be
precluded for ten days. Although the restraining order will only
temporarily resolve the problem, the order is necessary because the
harm to the public if the activity is not enjoined exceeds the harm to
the operator during the ten-day period of the restraining order. The
operator stands to lose some business for a period of ten to twenty
days if he is enjoined. The public, on the other hand, stands to lose
100% of its investment during that same period of time. If the gov-
ernment cannot prove its case at the preliminary injunction stage,
the order will automatically dissolve with minimal cost and inconven-
ience to the boiler room operator. If the government does prevail,
then the restraining order was clearly appropriate. The balancing
test, therefore, weighs in favor of the public's interest.
148. C. WRIGHT, sup'ra note 138, at 499.
149. Id, at 500; see also Levas & Levas v. Village of Antioch, 684 F.2d 446, 448 (7th
Cir. 1982) (TRO treated as one for preliminary injunction); In re Arthur Treacher's
Franchisee Litig., 689 F.2d 1150, 1154 (3d Cir. 1982) (temporary restraining order held
tantamount to a preliminary injunction); MLZ, Inc., 470 F. Supp. at 275 (application for
TRO treated as one for preliminary injunction where opponent was present at hear-
ing); Wisch v. Sanford School, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1310, 1311 (D. Del. 1976) (plaintiff's
motion for a TRO considered as one for preliminary injunction).
150. C. WRIGHT, supra note 138, at 500 (citation omitted); see Bailey v. Transporta-
tion-Communications Employees Union, 45 F.R.D. 444, 445 (N.D. Miss. 1968).
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D. Basis for the Preliminary Injunction
To successfully move for a preliminary injunction, the petitioner
must show: (1) substantial threat that the plaintiff will suffer irrepa-
rable damage in the absence of such relief; (2) that the plaintiff has a
substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits; (3) that the
threatened injury to the plaintiff outweighs the possible harm that
the injunction might cause any other parties; and (4) that the injunc-
tion will not be adverse to the public interest. 51
1. Irreparable Harm
Conditions precedent to the issue of a statutory injunction designed
to protect the public interest are less restrictive than the traditional
requirement under Rule 65.152 When "an injunction is expressly au-
thorized by statute and the statutory conditions are satisfied, the
usual prerequisite of irreparable injury need not be established." 153
Even without this rule, the government can usually meet the irrep-
arable injury test in the case of boiler room operations. In assessing
the propriety of extraordinary injunctive relief, it is proper to focus
first upon the prevention of injury which cannot later be redressed
through other remedies.154 Boiler room operators typically engage in
one or more schemes to defraud and frequently use an alias, operate
through nominee corporations, purchase property in other names,
move money offshore, and are often out of business and gone from
the area before the victims know they have been defrauded. Even if
the victims become enlightened and realize who defrauded them,
there are usually no funds available to compensate them.
Generally, a monetary loss is not a sufficient irreparable injury to
151. For cases in the Fifth Circuit, see Enterprise Int'l Inc. v. Corporacion Estatal
Petrola, 762 F.2d 464, 471 (5th Cir. 1985); Cate v. Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176, 1185 (5th Cir.
1983); Hardin v. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co., 572 F.2d 1106, 1107 (5th Cir. 1978); Canal
Auth. of Fla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974); see also supra note 120.
152. See infra note 153.
153. Southern Cent. Bell Tel. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 744 F.2d 1107, 1120
(5th Cir. 1984); see, e.g., Gresham v. Windrush Partners, 730 F.2d 1417, 1423 (11th Cir.)
("[Ilrreparable injury should be presumed from the very fact that the statute was vio-
lated."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 882 (1984); Trailer Train Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
697 F.2d 860, 869 (9th Cir.) ("The standard requirements for equitable relief need not
be satisfied when an injunction is sought to prevent the violation of a federal statute
which specifically provides for injunctive relief."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983);
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Lennen, 640 F.2d 225, 259 (10th Cir. 1981) (not necessary to
show irreparable injury where Congress has authorized federal courts to grant injunc-
tive relief).
154. Canal Auth. of Fla., 489 F.2d at 573.
support the issuance of a preliminary injunction. 5 5 A monetary loss
alone, however, will support a preliminary injunction if a legal rem-
edy for monetary damages would be clearly ineffective in making a
recovery. 5 6 "An injury is irreparable if it cannot be undone through
monetary remedies."'s 7 Such is the case with victims of boiler room
fraud. Although these victims have the potential to sue for damages,
it is clear that such civil suits would be ineffective to recover their
losses where funds are not available.
2. Prevail on the Merits
The supporting affidavit should clearly establish that the defend-
ants are engaged in one or more schemes involving mail, wire, and/or
bank fraud in violation of the statutory prohibition,1 58 and that inves-
tors and other parties will continue to be victimized unless defend-
ants are enjoined. The affidavit and the memorandum of points and
authorities in support of the petition should focus upon those factors
which would lead the judge to conclude that the defendants would
continue the unlawful conduct unless enjoined.
3. Harm to Other Parties; Public Interest
In the case of a boiler room operation, the proposed restraining or-
der and preliminary injunction generally will impact only defendants
and persons actively participating with them. Thus, it will have the
effect of inhibiting criminal conduct by freezing the improperly se-
cured funds in the hands of persons who were not entitled to them in
the first place.
Moreover, the injunction will benefit the public interest. The pur-
pose of the government's petition is to terminate criminal fraud and
compensate the fraud victims. In section 1345, Congress clearly de-
clared such injunctions to be in the public interest.
E. Basis for the Permanent Injunction
After the preliminary injunction is issued, the parties will nor-
mally engage in civil discovery before litigating the permanent in-
junction on the merits. At trial, the government must demonstrate
155. See Enterprse Int% Inc., 762 F.2d at 472 ("[Ilnjury is 'irreparable' only if it
cannot be undone through monetary remedies."); Deerfield Medical Center v. Deer-
field Beach, 661 F.2d 328, 338 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[I]njury is 'irreparable' only if it cannot
be undone through monetary remedies."); Morgan v. Fletcher, 518 F.2d 236, 240 (5th
Cir. 1975) ("Mere injuries ... in terms of money... are not enough.").
156. See Placid Oil Co. v. United States Dep't. of the Interior, 491 F. Supp. 895, 906
(N.D. Tex. 1980) (granting preliminary injunction because "[p]laintiffs would not be
compensated for economic loss even if they prevailed on the merits.").
157. Deerfield Medical Center, 661 F.2d at 338.
158. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344 (West 1984).
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not only that the defendant's conduct includes the perpetration of
mail, wire, and/or bank fraud, they must also show a "reasonable
likelihood" that the defendants will engage in future violations un-
less enjoined.159 Voluntarily agreeing to refrain from the unlawful
conduct in the future will not preclude an injunction.160
F Scope of Remedies Available
When enforcing remedial statutes such as the Securities Act of
1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Commodity Ex-
change Act of 1974, district courts have broad discretion to fashion
appropriate relief, including relief ancillary to the injunction, to ef-
fectuate the statutory purpose and policy.11
159. See, e.g., SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that when a
person is engaged or is about to engage in violating the securities laws, "only a reason-
able likelihood that the activity . . .will be repeated" must be shown); SEC v.
Youmens, 729 F.2d 413, 415 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984) (must show a
reasonable and substantial likelihood of future violations); SEC v. Washington County
Util. Dist., 676 F.2d 218, 227 (6th Cir. 1982) ("Proof of past violations ... serves as a
basis ... that future violations may occur."); SEC v. Bonastia, 614 F.2d 908, 912 (3rd
Cir. 1980) (to show reasonable likelihood, look to: scienter involved, recurrent nature
of violation, defendant's recognition of wrong, sincerity of his promises against future
violations, and defendant's professional occupation); SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1334
(5th Cir. 1978) (must prove more than past violations when offering positive proof of
future violations); SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 807 (2nd Cir.
1975) ("[P]ast illegal conduct is highly suggestive of the likelihood of future viola-
tions."); CFTC v. Skorupskas, 605 F. Supp. 923, 942 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (determination
based on totality of circumstances); CFTC v. Morgan, Harris & Scott, Ltd., 484 F. Supp.
669, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (inference can be drawn from past illegal conduct). But cf
CFTC v. Commodities Fluctuations Systems, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 1382, 1385 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (must look at totality of circumstances and past violations alone are not enough).
160. See SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 655-56 (9th Cir. 1980) (defendant's state-
ments of "reformation" were not sufficient to preclude summary judgment); Manage-
ment Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d at 807 ("[I]njunctive relief is not barred by a defendant's
disclaimer of an intent to violate the law in the future .. "); SEC v. Koracorp Indus.,
Inc., 575 F.2d 692, 698 (9th Cir.) (promises of reformation are relevant but not conclu-
sive or even necessarily persuasive), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
161. Materia, 745 F.2d at 200; CFTC v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 583
(9th Cir. 1983) (remedy ancillary to permanent injunction upheld); Chris-Craft Indus.
v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 390 (2nd Cir.) (court has power to grant all equi-
table relief necessary), cert denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); SEC v. Manor Nursing Cen-
ters, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1102 (2d Cir. 1972) (injunction alone would not protect the
public); see also Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288, 291-92 (1960) (jurisdiction
conferred by Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 includes remedial powers beyond those
expressly granted in the Act); CFTC v. Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211, 1222 (7th Cir.) (disgorge-
ment as an appropriate form of relief), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 921 (1979); SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2nd Cir. 1971) ("SEC may seek other than in-
junctive relief in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act, so long as such relief is
remedial relief and is not a penalty .... ); Morgan, Harris & Scott Ltd., 484 F. Supp.
at 677 (ancillary relief necessary); Kelley v. Carr, 567 F. Supp. 831, 840 (W. D. Mich.
Section 1345 is a remedial statute similar to those involving securi-
ties and commodities. Congress intended to authorize the courts to
take all actions necessary to terminate fraud and protect the public.
Section 1345 is no more narrowly written than the provisions author-
izing injunctions to remedy violations of the securities and commodi-
ties laws. Although the securities or commodities laws do not
specifically authorize ancillary relief, courts have nevertheless histor-
ically granted ancillary relief to combat violations. Similar remedies
therefore are available under section 1345 in cases where the govern-
ment shows the boiler room operator to be engaging in mail, wire,
and/or bank fraud and a reasonable likelihood of future violations.
The following sections discuss the major forms of ancillary relief
granted in securities and commodities cases.
G. Appointment of a Receiver
"The decision to appoint an equity receiver in enforcement actions
under the commodities and securities laws is a matter within the
sound discretion of the trial judge."'1 2 Receivers may recover funds
through ancillary actions.16 3 To the extent possible, attorneys seek-
ing the appointment of an equity receiver should specify in the order
the major duties which the receiver is to perform. By doing so, the
government can avoid litigation over which procedures the receiver is
authorized to perform; the only issue remaining would be whether
there was an abuse of discretion when the trial judge assigned the
task to the receiver. 164
H. Disgorgement and Restitution
Disgorgement or restitution orders attempt to remove the eco-
nomic incentive of crime and place the victims in their rightful posi-
tion. The disgorgement order may also deter future violations and
"future compliance may be more definitely assured if one is com-
1983) (disgorgement is an appropriate remedy); CFTC v. United States Metals Deposi-
tory Co., 468 F. Supp. 1149, 1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (court has broad discretion to enjoin
security law violations).
162. CFTC v. American Commodity Group Corp., 753 F.2d 862, 866 n.6 (11th Cir.
1984); see also CFTC v. Chilcott Portfolio Management, Inc., 713 F.2d 1467, 1482 (2nd
Cir. 1983) ("The court properly conferred the power on the receiver to sue."); Co Petro
Mktg. Group, 680 F.2d at 582-83 (district court properly ordered appointment of a re-
ceiver); Manor Nursing Center, Inc., 458 F.2d at 1105 (upholding appointment of trust-
ees or receivers); Carr, 567 F. Supp. at 841 (appointment of an "equity receiver" and an
accounting held proper); Morgan, Harris & Scott, Ltd, 484 F. Supp. at 679 (freeze order
designed to "preserve status quo until receiver is able to report).
163. American Commodity Group Corp., 753 F.2d at 866 n.6; Chilcott Portfolio Man-
agement, Inc., 713 F.2d at 1482; Morgan, Harris & Scott, Ltd., 484 F. Supp. at 679.
164. See American Commodity Group Corp., 753 F.2d at 866.
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pelled to restore one's illegal gains."'16 5 In addition, "it would frus-
trate the regulatory purposes of the Act[s] to allow a violator to
retain his ill-gotten gains."166
Attorneys for the government should choose how they want to ac-
complish the disgorgement or restitution. The government could
seek an order instructing the defendant(s) to pay certain sums of
money to certain specified individuals. In the alternative, the dis-
gorgement and restitution could be made through the mechanism of
a receiver. 167 If a receiver is needed to provide ancillary relief, attor-
neys for the government should ensure that the receiver is empow-
ered to initiate whatever judicial or administrative actions are
necessary to collect the assets of the promoter and to disburse those
funds to the victims in an equitable manner.168
I. Freezing, Impounding of Assets and Miscellaneous Relief
In addition or in the alternative to receivers and disgorgement, the
courts may order that the promoter's assets be frozen or im-
pounded. 69 It is necessary, however, to comply with all the proce-
dural requirements of section 1345. It is not sufficient to cite section
1345 as authority in seeking such orders in the context of a criminal
165. Co Petro Mktg. Group, 680 F.2d at 583 (citing Porter v. Warner Holding Co.,
328 U.S. 395, 400 (1946)).
166. Id. at 584; see also CFTC v. Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211, 1223 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 921 (1979); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2nd Cir.), cerL
denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971). For other cases in which disgorgement or restitution have
been ordered, see SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 201 (2nd Cir. 1984) (insider trading),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985); SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978) (fail-
ure by attorney to disclose beneficial interest in trust); CFTC v. Skorupskas, 605 F.
Supp. 923, 943 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (pyramid scheme); Kelley v. Carr, 567 F. Supp. 831,
840 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (high pressure sales techniques used to sell commodity futures
to unsophisticated buyers); SEC v. Scott, 565 F. Supp. 1513, 1536 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (secur-
ities analyst involved in a fraudulent stock offering), aff'd, 734 F.2d 118 (2nd Cir.
1984); SEC v. World Gambling, 555 F. Supp. 930, 931 (S.D.N.Y.) (unregistered securi-
ties), aff'd, 742 F.2d 1440 (2nd Cir. 1983); United States v. Wright, No. 85-1053 (D. Or.
1985) (action pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1345).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
168. See CFTC v. American Commodity Group Corp., 753 F.2d 862, 864 (11th Cir.
1984).
169. Id.; see also International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334, 1347, 1351
(2nd Cir.) (use of preliminary injunction as freezing method), cert denied, 417 U.S. 932
(1974); CFTC v. Morgan, Harris and Scott, Ltd., 484 F. Supp. 669, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(temporary freeze to ensure assets available to compensate public customers); United
States v. Harmon, No. C-86-1441A (N.D. Ga. June 27, 1986) (order pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 1345).
case.1 70 The court may order an accounting for money received and
disbursed by the promoter, either separately or as part of a disgorge-
ment/restitution order. 71
VIII. RULE 6(e) AND SELLS ENGINEERING
May an attorney for the Government presenting a criminal case to
a federal grand jury also represent the United States in a civil case
seeking an injunction pursuant to section 1345 which involves the
same parties and issues as the subject of the grand jury investigation?
If so, can the attorney use grand jury information in the civil case?
Can the attorney proceed pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(i) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure, or must he get an order pursuant
to Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i)?
In United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc.,7 2 the Supreme Court
ruled that attorneys in the Civil Division of the Department of Jus-
tice and their assistants and staff may not obtain automatic disclosure
of grand jury materials for use in a civil suit pursuant to Rule
6(e)(3)(A)(i) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, but instead
must seek an order pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i), as being prelimi-
nary to or in connection with a judicial proceeding, in order to gain
access to such materials.17i
We conclude, then, that Congress did not intend that "attorneys for the gov-
ernment," should be permitted free civil use of grand jury materials. Con-
gress was strongly concerned with assuring that prosecutors would not be free
to turn over grand jury materials to others in the Government for civil uses
without court supervision, and that statutory limits on civil discovery not be
subverted-concerns that apply to civil use by attorneys within the Justice
Department as fully as to similar use by persons in other government
agencies.1 7 4
Having decided that it was necessary to secure an order pursuant
to Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) prior to disclosing grand jury information to "an
attorney for the government" for use in a civil proceeding, the Court
then adopted the "particularized need" standard which it had previ-
ously outlined in Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest,175 as the
standard against which to measure such requests.
Parties seeking grand jury transcripts under Rule 6(e) must show that the
material they seek is needed to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial
170. See United States v. Jones, No. 1975-CSH, (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1986) (order deny-
ing motion for "an injunction preserving (defendants'] assets for restitution").
171. See American Commodity Group Corp., 753 F.2d at 864 (1984); CFTC v. Co
Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 1982); Kelley v. Carr, 567 F. Supp.
831, 841 (W.D. Mich. 1983). For a review of other available remedies, see McLucas,
Marchman & Dubow, Remedies Available in SEC Eqforcement Actions, 1986 SEC. EN-
FORCEMENT INST. at 880, 881.
172. 463 U.S. 418 (1983).
173. Id. at 427-35.
174. Id. at 442.
175. 441 U.S. 211, 217-24 (1979).
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proceeding, that the need for disclosure is greater than the need for continued
secrecy, and that their request is structured to cover only material so needed
It is clear from Proctor & Gamble and Dennis that disclosure is appropriate
only in those cases where the need for it outweighs the public interest in se-
crecy, and that the burden of demonstrating this balance rests upon the pri-
vate party seeking disclosure.1 7 6
The Court in Sells Engineering specifically refrained from addressing
the issue of the continued use of grand jury materials in the civil
phase of a dispute by an attorney who also conducted the criminal
prosecution. 177
Until recently, the Second and Eighth Circuits have differed some-
what in their analysis of this issue.178 In In re Grand Jury Investiga-
tion, the same government attorneys in the Antitrust Division who
had conducted the grand jury investigation were instructed to pursue
a civil investigation and, if appropriate, to prepare a civil com-
plaint.179 The grand jury investigation was already completed at the
time these attorneys initially received their civil assignment. 8 0 The
grand jury materials which they had accumulated included 250,000
pages of subpoenaed documents and the testimony of dozens of wit-
nesses. 8 1 The Second Circuit held that continued access to these
grand jury documents was a "disclosure" of grand jury information
that required an order pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(c)(i):
The testimony and documents here are voluminous, and we doubt that the
two attorneys could independently recall the details of 250,000 pages of sub-
poenaed documents or the details of testimony by dozens of witnesses. Civil
prosecution of the case would therefore invite them to refer repeatedly to the
documents and transcripts of which they have prior knowledge and with
which they may be partially familiar. Even when a criminal investigation has
generated far fewer materials, any resort to these materials by the attorneys
pursuing the civil matter to refresh their recollection as to documents or testi-
mony to which they had access in the grand jury proceeding is tantamount to
a further disclosure. Viewed in this context, to permit them continued access
to the materials is equivalent to "disclosure." 1 82
The Second Circuit noted that the real issue is whether the prosecu-
tor who conducted the grand jury investigation must be disqualified
from litigating the civil case. "[I]t would be almost impossible for any
176. Id. at 222-23; see also Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. at 433.
177. 463 U.S. at 431 n.15.
178. See United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 785 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1952 (1987); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 774 F.2d 34 (2nd
Cir. 1985), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1656 (1987).
179. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 774 F.2d at 36.
180. Id, at 35.
181. Id.
182. Id, at 40.
attorney in such a position to compartmentalize his thoughts and liti-
gate a civil case without in some way using his recollection of facts
learned during the grand jury investigation .. ."183 The court, how-
ever, did not find it necessary to reach that issue.
In United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.,184 the Antitrust
Division utilized a federal grand jury in the Northern District of Cal-
ifornia to investigate possible price-fixing by companies engaged in
corn milling. 85 Eighteen months after the grand jury concluded its
investigation, Nabisco leased its milling facilities to Archer-Daniels-
Midland.186 The Antitrust Division then began a civil investigation to
determine whether the lease agreement violated either the Sherman
or Clayton Antitrust Acts. 8 7 Some of the attorneys who were as-
signed to the civil investigation had previously been assigned to the
grand jury investigation. 8 8 The Eighth Circuit determined that the
assignment to a civil case of the same attorneys who participated in a
prior grand jury investigation did not constitute a disclosure of things
which occurred before the grand jury. The court felt that "[flor there
to be a disclosure, grand jury matters must be disclosed to someone.
We do not believe that an attorney's recollection of facts learned
from his prior grand jury participation can be considered disclosure
so as to invoke the prohibition of Rule 6(e)."189 The court acknowl-
edged the Second Circuit's decision in In re Grand Jury, but distin-
guished it because Archer-Daniels did not "contain a clear showing of
continued use of grand jury materials by attorneys assigned to the
civil litigation to refresh their recollection." 9 0 The Court also noted
that the attorneys in the civil case had not used and would not use
any grand jury material except to respond to defendant's discovery
efforts.19' Finally, the Eighth Circuit concluded that "our decision is
strengthened by the fact that the civil antitrust suit brought by the
Government against ADM and Nabisco alleging an unlawful acquisi-
tion or merger is a distinct and separate action from the prior grand
jury investigation for price-fixing." 92
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in United States v. John
Doe, Inc.,193 in order to resolve the conflict between the Second and
Eighth Circuits, and in the resolution of that conflict addressed the
183. Id, at 43.
184. 785 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1986).
185. Id, at 208.
186. I&
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id, at 212.
190. Id, at 213 n.12.
191. I& at 213 n.13.
192. Id, at 213.
193. 107 S. Ct. 1656 (1987).
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issue which they had avoided in Sells Engineering.194 The Supreme
Court agreed with the Eighth Circuit that the continued use of grand
jury information by attorneys who legitimately gained access to the
information did not constitute a disclosure within the meaning of
Rule 6(e).
[Ilt seems plain to us that Rule 6(e) prohibits those with information about
the workings of the grand jury from revealing such information to other per-
sons who are not authorized to have access to it under the Rule. The Rule
does not contain a prohibition against the continued use of information by at-
torneys who legitimately obtained access to the information through the
grand jury investigation.1 9 5
The Court went on to hold that such an attorney need "not obtain a
court order before refamiliarizing himself or herself with the details
of a grand jury investigation."196
While the Supreme Court's decision in John Doe effectively re-
futed the Second Circuit's suggestion that an attorney who conducted
or participated in a grand jury investigation must be excused from
any subsequent civil proceedings, the Court's decision leaves unan-
swered the question of what use that attorney can make of the grand
jury information in the civil suit. The Court accepted the Second
Circuit's finding that the filing of the civil complaint in this case did
not itself disclose grand jury information.197 After noting that the
complaint did not quote from or refer to grand jury transcripts, nor
to documents subpoenaed by or witnesses called before the grand
jury, the Court observed that "[a] Government attorney may have a
variety of uses for grand jury material in a planning stage, even
though the material will not be used, or even alluded to, in any filing
or proceeding."198
Using the guidance that the Supreme Court has provided in John
Doe, prosecutors who have conducted or participated in prior grand
jury investigations should be able to draft and file a complaint pursu-
ant to section 1345 without violating Rule 6(e) in virtually all in-
stances. The summary nature of the allegations contained in the
complaint generally will not require any quote from or reference to a
grand jury transcript, nor any reference to persons called as wit-
nesses before or documents subpoenaed by the grand jury. Immedi-
ately after the complaint is filed, however, the prosecutor will need
194. Id at 1658; see supra note 150 and accompanying text.
195. Id. at 1660.
196. Id at 1662.
197. Id. at 1661.
198. Id.
to rely on evidence collected during the course of the grand jury in-
vestigation to prove the allegations contained in the complaint for in-
junctive relief. The Supreme Court specifically refrained from
addressing this use of grand jury information in its decision in John
Doe.1 99
To the extent that a section 1345 proceeding is construed to be a
civil case, the attorney for the government could elect to seek a dis-
closure order pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure for use prior to or in connection with a judicial
proceeding. The scope of the court's order would govern the use of
grand jury material in the section 1345 proceeding. Of course, if the
proceeding is deemed to be a criminal one, the attorney for the gov-
ernment could still seek a Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) order to resolve any is-
sue with regard to disclosure. The question is whether such an order
is necessary before the attorney for the government can use grand
jury information in the litigation of a section 1345 proceeding. The
threshold inquiry would seem to be whether an attorney who liti-
gates an injunction pursuant to this section is involved in the litiga-
tion of a criminal or civil case.
When the grand jury conducts its investigation and returns an in-
dictment alleging violations of the mail, wire, and/or bank fraud stat-
utes,200 the attorney for the government is under no obligation to
seek a court order before using grand jury information to prove the
allegations contained in the indictment. If the government chooses to
litigate the indictment prior to the injunction, no court order will be
necessary before litigating the injunction proceeding. Section 1345
provides that if an indictment has been returned against the respon-
dent, discovery will be governed by the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.2 01 Rule 16(a)(1)(C) of those rules requires the govern-
ment to allow the defendant to inspect and copy all books, papers,
documents, etc., which are in the government's possession and are
either material to the preparation of the defendant's case or intended
for use by the government as evidence. Congress could not possibly
have intended to require the attorney for the government to seek an
order pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) in order to disclose the informa-
tion which Congress had already mandated in Rule 16(a)(1)(C). The
order pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) is within the sound discretion of
the supervising judge. To require such an order in an injunction pro-
ceeding where the defendant has already been indicted could subject
the attorney for the government to the untenable situation of being
199. The Court decided that case "[w]ithout addressing the very different matter of
an attorney's disclosing grand jury information to others inadvertently or purposefully,
in the course of a civil proceeding ..... Id. at 1662.
200. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344 (1984).
201. 18 U.S.C. § 1345 (Supp. 1986).
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required to disclose material pursuant to Rule 16(a)(1)(C), while si-
multaneously being prohibited from that disclosure because the su-
pervising judge determined that the request for disclosure did not
meet the particularized test of Sells Engineering20 2 and Petrol
Stops.2 03 Congress did not intend to interject the judiciary into rou-
tine discovery proceedings in which there is no dispute between the
government and defense with regard to the required disclosures.
Is a contrary result required if the government chooses to litigate
the injunction proceeding prior to indicting the respondent? If the
government chooses not to indict the respondent, will it be prohibited
from litigating a section 1345 injunction without first securing a Rule
6(e)(3)(C)(i) order? If the government seeks such an order, but the
government's application is denied, is the government prohibited
from seeking to enjoin fraudulent activity even if it is in possession of
proof by a preponderance of the evidence? There is an articulable
basis to believe that Congress intended section 1345 to be a criminal
proceeding, the litigation of which was not intended to be impeded
by the necessity of securing disclosure orders pursuant to Rule
6(e)(3)(C)(i).
First, Congress chose to place the remedy in Title 18 of the Code,
rather than in Title 28 or the titles which govern the mails, wires,
and banking institutions. The proceedings involved in Sells Engineer-
ing and John Doe were civil in nature. The underlying statute was
located in Title 28, and the suits both sought money damages. There-
fore, the injunction pursuant to a section 1345 criminal proceeding is
clearly distinguishable from the situation presented in those cases.
Second, Congress tied the injunction to proof that the respondents
were engaged in specific criminal conduct. In order to establish the
basis for an injunction pursuant to section 1345, the government must
prove that the defendant's conduct includes the perpetration of mail,
wire, and/or bank fraud. The evidence to prove both the underlying
criminal violation and the petition for the injunction are exactly the
same. The elements of the underlying criminal violation and the
cause of action pursuant to section 1345 are likewise the same, with
one exception. In order to establish the elements necessary to issue
the injunction, the government must establish not only the criminal
violation, but also show a reasonable likelihood that the conduct will
continue. This difference in the elements, however, is of no practical
202. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
consequence. There is no danger that the attorney for the govern-
ment would manipulate the grand jury into investigating issues irrel-
evant to the criminal charge in order to prove the case for an
injunction because if ongoing criminal conduct is involved, that is it-
self a legitimate area of inquiry for the grand jury.
Third, Congress created the remedy because it viewed the tradi-
tional criminal tools to be too slow and ineffective to terminate the
criminal conduct and designed the section 1345 injunction to supple-
ment the existing criminal tools. Treating the filing and litigation of
section 1345 proceedings as anything other than an exercise of the
prosecutor's duties under the criminal law renders the tool ineffec-
tive to accomplish the legislative purpose of the Act. Congress must
have known that the attorney for the government assisting the grand
jury in its investigation and his staff would be the only persons who
knew of the illegal conduct and had sufficient information to file the
complaint in the section 1345 injunctive proceeding. If Congress did
not intend the section 1345 injunction to be part of the government
attorney's duties in enforcement of the criminal law, then the effect
would be to require a 6(e)(3)(C)(i) order, with resultant disclosure of
only a limited scope of documents and testimony. If Congress did not
intend the section 1345 proceeding to be criminal in nature, the most
likely result would be to effectively deny the person with the most
knowledge the opportunity to enjoin the crime. If Congress did not
intend the section 1345 injunction to be criminal in nature, the likely
result would be extended delays inherent in civil discovery before the
government would be prepared to proceed to trial on the merits.
Congress acted to protect government investigative files by providing
that post-indictment discovery would be pursuant to the more restric-
tive criminal rules, rather than the civil rules, which are more advan-
tageous to the defense. It is inconceivable that Congress intended an
injunction be postponed until after an indictment before seeking a
6(e)(3)(C)(i) order to avoid the "discovery for civil purposes" concern
which the Supreme Court had voiced so clearly just one term before
in Sells Engineering. Yet this is exactly the result of concluding that
the section 1345 injunction is not part of the government attorney's
duties in enforcing the criminal law.
Fortunately, many section 1345 injunction cases will not require
resolution of this issue. In some instances, the government's criminal
investigation will be entirely administrative and there will be no
grand jury information to be disclosed. In other cases, the criminal
investigation might be a mixture of administrative and grand jury
proceedings, and the attorney can certify by affidavit that no grand
jury information is being used for the civil suit.
In cases where the grand jury conducts an investigation giving rise
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to evidence supporting an injunction, the preferred course of action
would be for the prosecutor to seek an order pursuant to Rule
6(e)(3)(C)(i) authorizing the use and disclosure of the grand jury ma-
terial as being preliminary to or in connection with a judicial pro-
ceeding. If the prosecution has received the 6(e) order, there is no
question but that use of the grand jury information is authorized.
The prosecutor who secures a 6(e) order should never have to face
the issue of a contempt citation for having willfully disclosed grand
jury information while litigating a section 1345 injunction.20 4 Even if
the prosecutor has not secured a 6(e) order, however, a strong case
can be made that a section 1345 injunctive proceeding is criminal in
nature and part of the government attorney's duties in the enforce-
ment of federal criminal law. In that case, for the purposes of the dis-
closure requirements of Rule 6(e), the section 1345 proceeding is
indistinguishable from trial pursuant to an indictment alleging viola-
tions of Title 18, United States Code, sections 1341, 1343 or 1344.
IX. CONCLUSION
The injunction proceeding pursuant to section 1345 is a viable tool
to be used by the United States in its efforts to combat boiler room
fraud and other investment fraud. The injunction can be used in con-
junction with traditional criminal prosecutions, or in lieu of prosecu-
tions in those cases where the government determines that criminal
prosecution is not warranted. The injunction can also be used to ter-
minate fraudulent activity much quicker than would be possible if
the government limited itself to the traditional, long-term criminal
investigation leading to indictment. While the section 1345 injunction
has yet to become a frequently used tool, the government is begin-
ning to derive benefits from its use.205
When enacting section 1345, Congress left open several questions
with regard to the use of grand jury information which are critical to
the implementation of the statute. In reality, most investigations of
large and complex mail, wire and bank fraud schemes are conducted
by grand juries. The issue regarding the use of grand jury informa-
tion by the attorney for the government in the litigation of section
1345 proceedings is something that federal prosecutors face every
204. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2).
205. See United States v. Alvin Petroleum Corp., No. 87-6826-CIV-Paine, (S.D. Fla.
1987) (enjoining the fraudulent promotion of partnership interests in oil and gas wells
and ordering an accounting and disgorgement of profits).
day. Uncertainty with regard to how grand jury information can be
utilized in this context has a chilling effect upon the willingness of
federal prosecutors to utilize the section 1345 proceeding. Congress
can make the injunction against fraud a more potent weapon by clari-
fying the guidelines regarding the use of grand jury information in
these proceedings and by removing all obstacles to the unfettered use
of this information in the litigation of section 1345 proceedings.
